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REDEFINING THE FAMILY:
RECOGNIZING THE ALTRUISTIC CARETAKER
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF RELATIONAL NEEDS
Beverly Horsburgh*
In The Fall,' a lawyer who fails to rescue a drowning
woman lapses into existential despair over the inherently self-
serving nature of human beings, alienated from one another
and incapable of altruistic conduct:
Are we not all alike, constantly talking and to no one,
forever up against the same questions although we know
the answers in advance? Then please tell me what
happened to you one night on the quays of the Seine and
how you managed never to risk your life. You yourself
utter the words that for years have never ceased echoing
through my nights and that I shall at last say through
your mouth: "0 young woman, throw yourself into the
water again so that I may a second time have the chance
of saving both of us!" A second time, eh, what a risky
suggestion! Just suppose ... that we should be taken
literally? We'd have to go through with it. Brr...! The
water's so cold! But let's not worry! It's too late now. It
will always be too late. Fortunately!2
His lament for the state of the human condition is both a
personal confession of fear and, in the lawyer's cynical and
apprehensive questioning, a revelation of one male response
to altruism. It is more than the risk of loss of life that inhibits
the lawyer from saving the woman. It is also loss of self. The
* Assistant Professor, St. Thomas University School of Law. B.A., Smith
College; J.D., University of Miami School of Law. Many thanks to Jay Silver and
Siegfried Wiessner, who shared in the development of this Article and were more
than generous with their time. I especially want to thank Mary Coombs for
criticizing an earlier draft and for affording me the benefit of her extraordinary
insight. I also appreciate the efforts of my two research assistants, Jeannete Lewis
and Jill Hillman.
This Article is dedicated to Michael Fischl, who enables his students to understand
that law can be an expression of social justice and that caring reaches beyond market
preferences.
1. ALBERT CAMUS, THE FALL (Justin O'Brien trans., Borzoi Books 1961) (1957).
2. Id. at 147.
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lawyer's male subjective self is isolated by his perception of
relationship as a loss of individuality and threatened by the
risks that giving to another entails.' Fearing self-destruction,
the lawyer has no choice but to let the woman drown.
Unlike Camus's lawyer, some women do not experience
altruism as threatening. For these women, caring is a
natural expression of the self in a relationship. Their identity
is shaped and enhanced by experiences of connection, and
3. Scholars have characterized this perception of relationship in a number of
ways. Gary Peller describes it thus: "The self does not see itself in the other
precisely because the other is an other, an object presenting the threat of objective
constraint to the freedom of the self." Gary Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law,
73 CAL. L. REV. 1152, 1277 (1985). Roberto Unger notes:
Consciousness implies autonomous identity, the experience of division from
other objects and from other selves. But the medium through which conscious-
ness expresses itself is made up of the symbols of culture, and these ... are
irreducibly social....
... The more precarious the bonds of common existence and belief.., the
less are they abie to express their consciousness through the social medium of
symbols, and therefore the less are they secure in the experience of individu-
ality that arises from consciousness. Nevertheless, the more intimate the
similarity of experience and reflection among individuals, the less of a basis
does individual identity seem to have.
ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITIcs 215 (1975).
In addition, Duncan Kennedy writes:
But at the same time that it forms and protects us, the universe of others...
threatens us with annihilation and urges upon us forms of fusion that are quite
plainly bad rather than good....
The kicker is that... the fashioning of an unalienated collective existence,
appears to imply such a massive increase of collective control over our lives that
it would defeat its purpose.... Coercion of the individual by the group appears
to be inextricably bound up with the liberation of that same individual.
Duncan Kennedy, The Structure ofBlackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205,
212 (1979).
Similarly, conservatives are threatened by theories and systems of distributive
justice as invasions of self-boundaries:
Whether it is done through taxation on wages or on wages over a certain
amount, or through seizure of profits, or through there being a big social pot so
that it's not clear what's coming from where and what's going where, patterned
principles of distributive justice involve appropriating the actions of other
persons. Seizing the results of someone's labor is equivalent to seizing hours
from him and directing him to carry on various activities .... This process
whereby they take this decision from you makes them a part-owner of you; it
gives them a property right in you.
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARcHy. STATE. AND UTOPIA 172 (1974).
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their values are frequently centered in an intimate ethos of
care and responsibility.4 Not all feminists agree that there
4. Carol Gilligan claims that women tend to formulate and resolve ethical
decisions in different ways than men, and that Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral
development, which is based on abstract principles of justice, is too narrow in its
definition of moral reasoning. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 1-2, 24-31
(1982). Gilligan interviewed a number of women for her research and at one point
noted: '[I]dentity is defined in a context of relationship and judged by a standard of
responsibility and care. Similarly, morality is seen by these women as arising from
the experience of connection and conceived as a problem of inclusion rather than one
of balancing claims." Id. at 160. She quotes one of the women interviewed: "By
yourself, there is little sense to things. It is like the sound of one hand clapping
Id. In a recent study edited by Gilligan, two distinct patterns of moral
reasoning are identified: a morality of care or responsiveness to others and a
morality of justice or fairness to others. In the caring model, "moral problems...
emerge from the recognition of. . . fractures in the, relationships between people or
from concerns that someone has been excluded or not taken care of.... [M]oral
problems are resolved by stepping into-not back from-the situation and by acting
to restore relationships or to address needs including those of oneself." MAKING
CONNECTIONS: THE RELATIONAL WORLDS OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS AT EMMA WILLARD
SCHOOL 42 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter MAKING CONNECTIONS]. In
the justice (Kohlberg) model, "moral problems are seen to emerge from the conflicting
claims of individuals and to be resolved through objectivity and the application of
principles of justice as fairness. Fair treatment and broadly contractual rules and
individual rights provide a set of related ideas within this orientation . . . ." Id. at
41. For surveys of the Gilligan-Kohlberg debate, see Lawrence Blum, Gilligan and
Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory, 98 ETHICS 472 (1988); Owen Flanagan &
Kathryn Jackson, Justice, Care and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revisited,
97 ETHICS 622 (1987). Flanagan and Jackson contend most individuals use both
types of reasoning. Different kinds of moral problems require choosing an appro-
priate orientation to the problem presented. However, "for most individuals one way
of seeing moral problems dominates the other way of seeing to some degree, and...
the direction of dominance is correlated with gender." Id. at 625; see also Colloquy,
The 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Feminist Discourse, Moral Values,
and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 48 (1985) [hereinafter James
McCormick Mitchell Lecture] (Gilligan stating that most people who use both voices
tend to focus on one orientation).
Feminist writers have explored the concept of gendered value systems from a
variety of perspectives. Seyla Benhabib argues that Kohlberg's definition of the
moral domain and his ideal of moral autonomy are similar to the social contract
theories of Hobbes and Rawls. All of these theories exclude women's experiences and,
therefore, fail in their universalist intentions. Seyla Benhabib, The Generalized and
the Concrete Other: The Kolhberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory, in FEMI-
NISM AS CRITIQUE: ON THE POLITICS OF GENDER 77, 81 (Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla
Cornell eds., 1987). Robin West attributes the difference between how men and
women define identity to women's potential for physical connection to others, an
innate biological determinant. Women carry and bear children, while men, in
contrast, are separated physically from the rest of human life. A male's awareness
of his isolation from others is an underlying premise of all modern legal theory,
creating an essentially masculine jurisprudence. Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1988). West emphasizes the contradictions that
lie within both of these definitions of identity. Men celebrate autonomy and fear
physical annihilation, while at the same time they long for connection and dread
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is a difference in values between men and women, and those
who do believe a separate value system exists do not agree on
whether it represents an essential gender difference or is the
result of cultural conditioning.5 Although I do not claim to
speak for all women or to describe essential nonhistorical
immutable features of womanhood, I believe that the caring
ethic is closer to the perspective of the women discussed in
this Article than is the law's traditional approach.
In this Article, I examine issues surrounding the caretaker,
a recurrent presence in contract, tort, and family law.
Believing relational interests are more important than self-
interest and unconcerned with economic gain, a caretaker
empathetically reacts to another's needs, providing services
without protecting herself by negotiating for a return. I argue
that the law, reflecting a more typically male value system
and method of moral reasoning, a jurisprudence circumscribed
by abstract principles of autonomy and reciprocity, suppresses
the caretaker's values and denies altruistic caring.6 The very
emotional alienation. Women value intimacy and fear emotional separation, yet seek
individuation and dread physical invasion. Id. at 36-37; see also infra note 150.
5. Some feminists have criticized or rejected the notion of gendered values.
Catharine MacKinnon, using a Marxian critique of idealism as a model, questions the
assertion that there is a fundamental gender difference in moral reasoning and
insists that a woman's caring ethic is just another aspect of male domination. The
relational perspective is an expression of dependence, not altruism. "Women are said
to think in relational terms. Perhaps women think in relational terms because
women's social existence is defined in relation to men." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 51 (1989). Drucilla Cornell rejects West's
phenomenology of an essential woman engraved by her biology and reproductive
capacity as only a description of woman's situation. Through imagining new myths
and metaphors, what she calls ethical feminism, we can create the ideals of the
feminine. Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the
Feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 646-50, 667-73, 696-99 (1990). Joan Williams
sees the caring ethic as dangerous, enlisting women in their own oppression. Women
come to believe that they prefer to sacrifice their careers, rejecting individualism and
competition in order to raise children. Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87
MICH. L. REV. 797, 830 (1989). Postmodernist feminists reject any claim to
knowledge of an essential woman or of values universal to all women, insisting
instead that identity is a product of complex, social forces within a particular context,
time, and place in history. A particularly good discussion of postmodernism and
feminism can be found in Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 829, 877-80 (1990). Black feminists and lesbians criticize the tendency of
white, heterosexual feminists to exclude their perspectives and experiences. See
generally ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the
Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1990); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essen-
tialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
6. Altruism has as many definitions as there are commentators defining the
term. My definition suggests that empathy, the capacity to emotionally identify with
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nature of the legal discourse disables the caretaker from
expressing her values accurately.
Part I of this Article describes the general nonrecognition of
altruism in the law. It then focuses on contract law, discussing
cases involving parties who cohabitate without formalizing their
relationship in a marriage, and those who are not sexually
intimate but are nevertheless interrelated members of an
extended family. I argue that when a relationship ends, a
caretaker becomes aware of her sacrifice and effort on behalf of
another and experiences a sense of loss. However, recovery in
contract requires the perverse recharacterization of the parties
as self-seeking strangers impersonally bargaining over market
services in a commodity exchange. Courts indulge in the legal
fiction that the caretaker bestowed services with the expecta-
tion of being paid, ignoring the family bonding and commodify-
ing what is an expression of love into the sale of labor.
another person, is the motivating factor behind altruistic behavior. The altruist sees
individuals in their own contexts and according to their own needs, rather than
assuming others are the same as herself. See MAKING CONNECTIONS, supra note 4,
at 42, 46. Altruism has been described by Duncan Kennedy as including a "vulner-
ability to non-reciprocity." Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685, 1718 (1976). For Richard Titmuss, donating
blood to an unknown stranger is an act of gifting that comes closest to capturing pure
altruism. He investigates the various methods used to obtain and distribute blood,
comparing Britain's voluntary social programs with the market system of paid donors
in the United States, and argues that voluntary donations further feelings of
community while market transactions separate and isolate us from each other.
RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GI~r RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL
POLICY 237-46 (1971). In a truly voluntary donation, "there is no formal contract, no
legal bond, no situation of power, domination, constraint or compulsion, no sense of
shame or guilt, no gratitude imperative, no need for penitence, no money and no
explicit guarantee of or wish for a reward or a return gift." Id. at 89. Phillipe
Rushton, a behaviorist, defines altruism as "social behavior carried out to achieve
positive outcomes for another rather than for the self." J. Phillipe Rushton, Altruism
and Society: A Social Learning Perspective, 92 ETHICS 425, 427-28 (1982). Dennis
Krebs positions altruism within an organized thought system, a cognitive learning
approach. Because structures of reasoning progress through orderly stages of
intellectual development, one's definition of altruism and its importance as a value
change as one achieves more sophisticated levels of thought. Dennis Krebs,
Psychological Approaches to Altruism: An Evaluation, 92 ETHICS 447, 448 (1982).
For instance, at stage five on the Kohlberg scale of moral development, altruism
could mean "fostering the greatest good for the greatest number." Dennis Krebs, A
Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Altruism, in ALTRUISM, SYMPATHY, AND
HELPING 141, 155 (Lauren Wisp6 ed., 1978). Jeffrey Harrison distinguishes between
two kinds of altruism. One is based on a hierarchical ranking of values. A moral
principle is afforded lexical priority over the lesser value of wealth maximization,
stage five on the Kohlberg model. In the second form, a collective goal is internalized
as a personal preference. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market
Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1336-38 (1986).
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Part II comments on some of the reasons for the law's
reluctance to legitimize the nontraditional family and its
inability to believe that altruism is a credible explanation for
the caretaker's conduct. Compelling the recipient to compen-
sate the caretaker without his having voluntarily assumed the
obligation in a contract blurs the bright-line rules defining the
family, which separate the private from the public sphere, and
imposes a generalized duty of care in the public world. The
law guards the boundaries of a divided world because, as a
society, we are unable to express a coherent ideology of
altruistic collective responsibility. In an impersonal, bureau-
cratized society, influenced by a philosophy as well as a
psychology celebrating a self in separation from others, we
have come to believe in the social divisions the law tells us
cannot be changed.
Part III argues that the discourse is also an outgrowth of a
divided society in which many women identify with their
mothers and assume responsibility for child care and house-
work, while men are raised to earn a living in the market. An
individual's sense of self and the self's relationship to others
is in part affected by the fact that women assume primary
responsibility for child care.7 The female child, raised by the
same-sex caretaker, internalizes the mother, gradually
evolving an experience of self that is subjectively relational.
The male, however, is compelled to detach himself from the
opposite-sex caretaker at an early stage of development and
forms a firmly bounded ego in denial of the maternal bond.
Despite the felt need for intimacy, many men perceive
connection to others as a threatening invasion of self-
boundaries.
7. See NANCY J. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 169-70 (1978)
[hereinafter CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING]. Nancy Chodorow has
provided one possible framework for a feminist jurisprudence. She turns to object
relations theory to explain personality and concludes that Freud was wrong in
considering the ego development of males and females to be the same. The gender
of the primary caretaker influences the female child to experience individuation in
a way that is very different from the male. The difference in development is not
innate or biological, but is rather socially and psychologically created in the family.
See NANCY J. CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 45-65 (1989)
[hereinafter CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY]. Carol Gilligan's
theory of a gender difference in moral reasoning can be seen as a logical outgrowth
of Chodorow's work. See GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 4, at 7-8. It
is possible that parenting and attachment to the primary caretaker, not genetics, play
a major role in psychologically molding an individual's conceptualization of morality.
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In the caretaker cases, the genderized difference in outlook
can reach an extreme. According to the woman's relational
perspective, the recipient is responsible for her economic
security. Under a justice model of moral reasoning, however,
the only obligations the recipient has incurred are those in a
provable contract. It is also possible that the intimate nature
of the relationship elicits the male lawmaker's deepest fears.
The caretaker is identified with the primary caretaker and the
recipient becomes the male child. Expressing the childhood
developmental issues of male lawmakers, these cases reflect
the primal struggle of a young male to gain independence from
the primary caretaker and the resultant fear that interdepen-
dence is a regression to childhood, entailing a loss of self. The
recipient's need for the caring given by the caretaker is
suppressed from the analysis because of childhood longings
associating connection with dependency. Fear of self-
destruction causes the law to deny altruism and to reconstruct
the relationship as a socially acceptable bargain exchange
between two mature, autonomous males.
The last part of this Article suggests a solution that is both
a legal reform and a structural change. First, I propose that
we redefine the family to include the many surrogate parents
and siblings who, though not in a sexual relationship with the
person receiving their care, assume responsibility for a
recipient's daily needs. I also propose that after two years or
the birth of a child, cohabitants should be considered formally
married. Legal recognition of this relationship enhances the
caretaker's self-worth and respects her dignity as a human
being. Second, because recognition only places caretakers in
the same financial situation that many wives face at divorce,
I also suggest a number of divorce reforms to redress the harm
of relational loss, suffered by all long-term caretakers whether
married in fact or in law. The caretaker's dependence on the
relationship should be presumed when determining support
and property awards to reflect existing socioeconomic condi-
tions, in which domestic responsibilities are genderized and
workplace expectations are not sensitive to the concerns of the
family. Finally, to remedy the underlying inequality between
men and women and to degenderize the ethic of care, we need
to redefine social roles within the family and create an
environment in which it is possible for men and women to
share parenting responsibilities. A workplace regulated by
law to consider the family's needs is a requisite first step in
WINTER 1992]
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healing a gender-polarized society. If we work together to
redefine the family by including its forgotten members and by
facilitating co-parenting, we can express a new collective ethic.
As a society, we can choose to value caring more than com-
merce, enriching our lives as interrelated human beings.
I. THE NONRECOGNITION OF ALTRUISM IN THE LAW
A. Denial of Altruism in General
The only relationship in which the law acknowledges and at
times compels altruism is in the traditional family, where a
shared identity of interest is assumed to be present.8 Because
giving to a family member inures to the benefit of all within
the family unit, caring is not seen as self-sacrificing behav-
ior.9 The needs of the individual are subsumed by a greater
good. The individualist takes existence outside the family,
where the law neither requires nor encourages altruism.
Under the common law there is no general duty to help a
stranger in an emergency."0 The traditional nomenclature
8. Frances Olsen traced the history of laws regulating the family and
pinpointed a fundamental market/family dichotomy. In the regime of the family
where women generally raise children and take care of the home, conduct between
family members is believed to be motivated by affection and a willingness to sacrifice.
Altruism is assumed to be the highest value in the family, whereas in the regime of
the market-the predominantly male workplace-individuals are encouraged to
pursue self-interest. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1497, 1501-05 (1983). Olsen argues
that "W[t]he morality of altruism has been supposed to animate the family to the same
extent that the morality of individualism has been supposed to pervade the
marketplace." Id. at 1505.
The idealization of the family has led to the law's inability to understand the
importance of protecting its vulnerable members. The family is not always a safe
repository for love. Murder, incest, assault, and the domination and exploitation of
women and children occur in the regime of privacy. For an account of the dark side
of family as a patriarchal institution, see SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE
FAMILY 134-69 (1989) and DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 133 (1989).
9. Paradoxically, sociobiology explains kin altruism as genetically selfish
behavior. The tendency to sacrifice for one's relatives is an instinctive genetic
survival response to enhance the replication of DNA. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE
SELFISH GENE 97 (1976); see also Rushton, supra note 6, at 428-29. From this
perspective, altruism as we usually think of it never exists, not even in the family.
10. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; see also Handiboe v.
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b~littles voluntary caring and indicates an antagonism to the
altruist who responds. Heroic rescuers and salvagers must
overcome the overt suspicion of officiousness" and are often
characterized as "mere volunteers" or as "intermeddlers."'2
Even if there is no question of unwanted interference, and
despite the policy advantages of encouraging assistance in an
emergency, there is no recovery in restitution unless rescuers
can prove that they are not altruists and that they acted with
McCarthy, 151 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (holding that a property owner
has no duty to rescue a drowning child); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058
(Ind. 1901) (holding that a physician has no duty to enter into a contract to provide
medical care). Many commentators have criticized the principle of nonintervention.
See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive
Structure of the Law ofAffirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986); Jay Silver,
The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 423
(1985); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980).
Leslie Bender has developed a feminist's standard of care: a duty to act responsibly
with the same care for strangers that we give those we know. Leslie Bender, A
Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 3, 35 (1988).
11. The Restatement of Restitution states in part:
A person who has supplied things or services to another, although acting
without the other's knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from
the other if
(a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and
(b) the things or services were necessary to prevent the other from
suffering serious bodily harm or pain, and
(c) the person supplying them had no reason to know that the other would
not consent to receiving them, if mentally competent; and
(d) it was impossible for the other to give consent or, because of extreme
youth or mental impairment, the other's consent would have been immaterial.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 116 (1937).
Officiousness has been defined in terms of four components: unrequested, forced,
unbeneficial, and unnecessary. Edward W. Hope, Officiousness, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 25,
27 (1929).
12. John Dawson has suggested that the terminology is intended to ameliorate
the "beguiling effect of the unjust enrichment principle." John P. Dawson, The Self-
Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1409 (1974). John Wade has proposed
that the pejorative terms not be used and has defined a more neutral principle of
recovery:
One who, without intent to act gratuitously, confers a measurable benefit upon
another, is entitled to restitution, if he affords the other an opportunity to
decline the benefit or else has a reasonable excuse for failing to do so. If the
other refuses to receive the benefit, he is not required to make restitution
unless the actor justifiably performs for the other a duty imposed upon him by
law.
John W. Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REV.
1183, 1212 (1966).
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the expectation of compensation. 3 Tort law permits a
rescuer to recover for personal injury damages, however.
14
In such cases the focus of the court is on the autonomy of the
rescuer, who is compensated because someone interfered with
the rescuer's right to be free from bodily harm, 5 not
because of the rescue services. Tort law's indifference to the
rescuer's lack of a monetary motive is not a validation of
altruism, but is rather a recognition of the limit placed on
the stretch of the victim's autonomy. That is, a victim's right
to pursue self-interest does not reach as far as causing
physical harm.'" Because the victim has negligently created
13. The drafters of the Restatement of Restitution explained:
[A] person who acts entirely from motives of humanity is not entitled to
restitution. The fact that the person acting is in the business of supplying the
things or is acting in the course of his profession, is evidence of an intent to
charge. On the other hand, a non-professional person who gives a compara-
tively small amount of service normally would be considered as having no intent
to charge for the services, in the absence of evidence of such intent.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 114 cmt. c (1937). Physicians and other profes-
sionals are therefore more likely to recover than other altruists. See, e.g., Cotnam
v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164, 165-66 (Ark. 1907) (holding that a doctor may recover in
quasi contract for rendering emergency services). If the caring is over an extended
period of time or the rescuer is performing another's duty, recovery may be granted.
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.20, at 106 (2d ed. 1990); see also
Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A.2d 390, 399 (N.J. 1953) (finding that parents who were
under a duty to provide medical services to their daughter were liable to a physician
for his services).
14. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, § 44, at 307-08, § 68, at 491; see also
Levmore, supra note 10, at 898 (pointing out that a rescuer has a better chance of
recovering for his injuries if the negligence of the victim, rather than that of a third
party, has led to the need for rescue); Wade, supra note 12, at 1188 n.26 (noting that
several states have enacted legislation providing for government reimbursement to
a private citizen injured while attempting to prevent the commission of a crime
against the personal property of another).
15. This is subject to the limitation that the rescuer's decision to take the risk
was reasonable. See, e.g., Provenzo v. Sam, 244 N.E.2d 26, 28 (N.Y. 1968) (allowing
recovery if the rescuer acted reasonably under the circumstances); Ruth v. Ruth, 372
S.W.2d 285, 288-89 (Tenn. 1963) (holding that, under the rescue doctrine, plaintiffs
are not guilty of contributory negligence if they acted as reasonable and ordinarily
prudent persons would in the circumstances).
16. Duncan Kennedy explains liberalism's justification of the law's position as
follows:
The function of law is the definition and enforcement of rights, of those limits
on the pursuit of self-interest that distinguish an individualist from a purely
egotistical regime. The great preoccupation of individualist legal philosophy is
to justify these restrictions, in the face of appetites that are both boundless and
postulated to be legitimate.
Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1715.
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the need for rescue and is at fault, it seems fair to impose
compensation as long as the rescuer has acted reasonably.
In their writings, William Landes and Richard Posner argue
that rewards for rescue and sanctions for nonrescue would
lead to inefficient results, as well as undesirable social behav-
ior, 17 and that altruistic rescuers at times act without the
expectation of compensation.18 However, a rescuer could be
afforded the choice to accept or to decline a reward. 9 Quite
possibly, heroic rescuers, as altruists, would seldom claim
compensation solely for the act of rescue. The loss in time and
effort for one's labor is not significant. Heroic rescuers would
plausibly seek compensation for injuries or for out-of-pocket
expenses. Since negligence is a convenient tool for compensat-
ing injury, expenses remain the major uncompensated loss.2"
In any case, there is no empirical proof that altruism is
increased by a lack of regulation or decreased if it is rewarded
and at times required. An efficiency analysis assumes that
most individuals value only their own economic well-being and
act accordingly, regardless of the law. Such an analysis
ignores the influence of the law in shaping a person's values.
A sense of community caring can be furthered by a policy of
remuneration, emphasizing collective responsibility as a
positive social goal. The current state of the law prioritizes
17. Landes and Posner contend that the imposition of liability for failure to aid
a stranger will cause some potential rescuers to avoid activities where rescue
opportunities are likely to occur, thus decreasing the number of rescues performed.
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and
Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83,
120-23 (1978). They also argue against a generalized duty of rescue by supposing
that rescuers are motivated by a desire to be recognized as altruists. If a duty were
imposed, it would be impossible for a rescuer to prove he was motivated by altruism
instead of a fear of liability; thus, liability would reduce the recognition afforded to
the rescuer. Id. at 124. Their argument presupposes that social approval and glory
are the motivating factors for rescue, not caring for another's welfare. For a reasoned
response to the other issues raised by Landes and Posner, which also points out the
differences between penalties and rewards, see Levmore, supra note 10, at 884-86.
18. Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 94.
19. See Levmore, supra note 10, at 885-86. Levmore believes large penalties, as
opposed to modest rewards, could prove to be a disincentive. On the other hand, the
argument that sanctions deter altruism proves too much. Even if it could be
demonstrated that imposing liability interferes with pure altruism, we would not
decriminalize murder or do away with tortious liability to facilitate volunteerism. Id.
at 885 n.25. An unregulated society does not necessarily facilitate altruism. Rather,
it can lead to social behavior governed by nothing more than survival of the fittest.
20. See, e.g., Prior Aviation v. New York, 418 N.Y.S.2d 872, 879 (Ct. Cl. 1979)
(denying compensation for a destroyed helicopter to the owner who voluntarily
cooperated with the police in rescuing people whose boat capsized near Niagara
Falls).
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economics over the welfare of the community: unless the
victim is a member of the family, the duty to rescue is limited
to those who assume the obligation as a term of contract and
thus are paid for their rescue services; and to those who stand
to gain some form of economic profit from their relationship
with the victim.21 The imposition of a duty tends to be
consistent with principles of enterprise liability, not altruism.
Criminal law draws a critical distinction between defense of
others and self-defense. In some jurisdictions, a Good Samari-
tan who uses force to protect another from harm is not
entitled to the privilege of defense of others if the person
protected is not able to claim the privilege of self-defense.22
Even the reasonable belief that the victim is an innocent party
and not the initial aggressor is not justified. 23  Altruism is
criminalized, and good faith intervenors act at their peril.
21. The limitation on rescue reflects an attempt in the late nineteenth century
to demarcate purely consensual private law from public regulation:
Contract law thus became the core of the private law system. In this core
area, people were free to act in a self-interested manner, without regard to the
interests, needs, or expectations of others.... The separation of torts and
status from contract also served to isolate the few remaining altruistic duties
left in the legal system; the duty to affirmatively act to help others absent a
prior agreement to do so was restricted to family members and to quasi-
contractual relations, such as obligations of common carriers and innkeepers.
Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 481 (1988) (reviewing
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)); cf Levmore, supra note
10, at 899-900 (arguing that the growing number of exceptions to the rule of no duty
to rescue signals expansion of a duty). Aside from husband and wife and parent and
child, a duty to rescue is imposed in some jurisdictions on the following relationships:
common carrier and passenger, innkeeper and guest, innkeeper and stranger,
employer and employee, ship and crewman, shopkeeper and business visitor, host and
social guest, jailor and prisoner, school and pupil, tavern keeper and patron, landlord
and trapped trespasser, safety engineer and laborer, physician and patient,
psychologist and injured victim of patient, manufacturer and consumer, landlord and
tenant, parole board and victim of parolee, and lastly, drinking companions. Id. at
899-900 nn.56-75.
22. The rescuer commits a criminal assault in mistakenly attempting to aid
another who has been subjected to lawful arrest. See, e.g., State v. Wenger, 390
N.E.2d 801, 803-04 (Ohio 1979); State v. Gelinas, 417 A.2d 1381, 1386 (R.I. 1980).
But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 (1962) (stating that the use of force to protect
another is justified if, among other things, "under the circumstances as the actor
believes them to be," the person protected would be justified in using force).
Traditionally, the use of force in defense of another was limited to situations where
a special relationship existed, such as parent/child or master/servant. Id. § 3.05
cmt. 1.
23. See Wenger, 390 N.E.2d at 803-04; Gelinas, 417 A.2d at 1386. There is a
privilege of self-defense, however, for mistakenly but reasonably believing force was
needed to save oneself. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 205 N.E.2d 749, 753 (Ill. 1965);
State v. Spaulding, 257 S.E.2d 391, 396 (N.C. 1979).
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In the workplace, individuals at times come to the aid of
their fellow employees by engaging in protest activities out of
a spirit of solidarity and caring. Labor law, however, dis-
counts the possibility of altruism by not protecting the
protesting activity from employer retaliation unless it person-
ally benefits the protestors. The Supreme Court interprets
"mutual aid or protection" in Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act 24 as protecting only protests undertaken in the
protestor's self-interest.
25
In constitutional law, the scope of Article III standing in
federal court does not include claims filed because of a concern
for the rights of others. The "case" or "controversy" require-
ment is limited to the claimant's own personal injury or
"injury-in-fact."26  Standing to invoke the protection of the
Fourth Amendment projects an imagery of extreme isolation.
There is no right to recover for a search or seizure unless the
police unreasonably searched or seized one's own person or
property.27
24. The provision states in part: "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
... ." National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §157 (1988).
25. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 569 (1978) (holding that union
employees who protested the presidential veto of a raise in minimum wage and who
earned above the minimum wage level were protected from employer retaliation by
the NLRA because they have an interest in a high minimum wage which drives up
the wage levels of union employees). For a thoughtful discussion of labor law,
solidarity, and altruism, see Richard M. Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7:
Mutualism and Protected Protest Activities Under the National Labor Relations Act,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 789 (1989).
26. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106 (1983) (holding that
the plaintifflacked standing because it was unlikely that he again would be subjected
to the potentially fatal chokehold); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 482-83 (1982) (stating
a public interest group lacked standing based on a claim of a "shared individuated
right to a government that shall make no law respecting the establishment of
religion"); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972) (denying standing to
the Sierra Club because it failed to allege any direct injury to its members). For a
demonstration that Article III standing was not intended historically to be limited
to private dispute adjudication, see Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and
the Proble~m of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
27. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2797-98, 2801 (1990)
(holding that a woman who was no longer living with her boyfriend could not
consent to a search of his premises, but the police officer's reasonable belief that she
had authority to consent justified use of the evidence obtained); Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (holding that passengers in a car lacked standing to object
to a search of the car's interior because they did not have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the area searched). An interesting feminist perspective on the Fourth
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Even the tax code constrains altruism. The Internal
Revenue Code institutionalizes a particular form of giving by
allowing income tax deductions only for donations to private
foundations or to public charities.28 Contributing money to
a hospital is a tax-deductible item, for example, but the very
same amount spent on a friend's hospital bill cannot be
recouped on an income tax return. The personal nature of
giving is not recognized.
Contract law also denigrates the value of gifting. Donative
promises are assumed to involve relatively small sums,
unworthy of a court's time and efforts, 2 and are not enforce-
able unless the promisor induced the recipient to suffer an
economic loss."° The usual justifications for refusing to honor
gratuitous promises denote skepticism and distrust of conduct
unmotivated by pecuniary gain. Such promises are regarded
as impulsive and occurring in emotional circumstances, al
Amendment can be found in Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amend-
ment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593 (1987).
28. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1988); see Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 486 (1990)
(holding that a contribution is "for the use of" a qualified organization under § 170 only
when the funds are donated in trust for the organization or in some other enforceable
legal arrangement).
29. Richard Posner argues the following:
Perhaps, then, the real reason for the law's generally not enforcing gratuitous
promises is not a belief, which would be economically unsound, that there is a
difference in kind between the gratuitous and the bargained-for promise, but an
empirical hunch that gratuitous promises tend both to involve small stakes .and
to be made in family settings where there are economically superior alternatives
to legal enforcement.
Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411,
417 (1977). There is an institutional exception for promises made to public charities,
however; promises to charities are enforceable without proof that the promise induced
the promisee to suffer a loss. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1981).
The reason for this exception may be that such promises are considered more likely to
be concerned with large sums and therefore merit the attention of the law.
30. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as
justice requires.
(2) A charitable subscription .. is binding under Subsection (1) without proof
that the promise induced action or forbearance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
31. For example, one commentator states:
But since actors involved in a donative transaction are often emotionally
involved, and since the donative promisor tends to look mainly to the interests
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suggesting that gifting is an irrational act. Instead, commercial
transactions dominate the landscape of contracts.
The bargain theory of contract, part of a system of rules
regulating promises to exchange goods, property, and services
in a technologically complex and impersonal society, paints a
of the promisee, an informal donative promise is more likely to be uncalculated
than deliberative. Indeed, such promises may raise a problem akin to capacity,
because they are frequently made in highly emotional states brought on by
surges of gratitude, impulses of display, or other intense but transient feelings.
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979). The use of
the seal, a relatively simple method of providing demonstrable evidence of a donative
promise as well as a serious intent to be bound, has passed out of favor in most
jurisdictions. Id. at 8-9.
In contrast with the common law's approach, many civil law jurisdictions enforce
notarized donative promises. See JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES 29-196
(1980) (discussing the French and German codes). The civil law's willingness to
enforce donative promises does not necessarily indicate a policy to encourage
altruism, however. Dawson compared the common law's refusal to enforce a promise
to bestow a gift or undo a fully executed transfer with the civil law's complex system
of regulation, and suggested that the civil law's purposes in controlling gifting are to
protect the heirs to an estate and to guard against the depletion of the estate's assets.
Id. at 221-30.
32. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts sets forth, in pertinent part, the modem
bargain theory of mutual reciprocal inducement:
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be
bargained for.
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the
promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange
for that promise.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
The classic explanation of the meaning of consideration is provided by Williston:
It is often difficult to determine whether words of condition in a promise indicate
a request for consideration or state a mere condition in a gratuitous promise. An
aid, though not a conclusive test in determining which construction of the promise
is more reasonable is an inquiry whether the happening of the condition will be
a benefit to the promisor. If so, it is a fair inference that the happening was
requested as a consideration.
SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 112, at 233 (1920). When the motives
are mixed, the law assumes that selfishness predominates. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. c (1981) ("Even where both parties know that a transaction is
in part a bargain and in part a gift, the element of bargain may nevertheless furnish
consideration for the entire transaction."). As Ian Macneil notes:
[f there is one thing that transactionized economics does not tolerate it is
altruism in favor of exchange partners. Few things can more quickly mess up
economic models than behavior in which market participants fail to maximize
transactional utilities. Altruistic behavior as to other participants in the market
does precisely that, and is likely to be characterized by microeconomic model
builders along with all such failures as "irrational" behavior.
Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 723 n.97 (1974).
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particularly bleak picture of human relationships and behav-
or. Isolated individuals are induced to depend fleetingly on
each other to achieve unrelated goals. It is a transient
relationship, the result of increasingly specialized modes of
production.34 Within the social relationship defined by the
theory, each party is unable to understand intuitively or to
share in the aspirations of the other. Two market maximizers
come together only to be enabled to part company. Although
the requirement of consideration serves ostensibly as an
objective method to protect autonomy and restrain courts from
institutionalizing values, it imagines the furtherance of a
person's ends as the only meaningful way to exercise free
choice. There is self-determination only if there is self-
advancement. Bargain theory denies the existence of altruism
without ever explicitly stating that it has done so and without
justifying the omission. Self-interest, a subjective, substantive
component, is presumed the only rational motivation for a
promise or a performance. Consideration remains a funda-
mental tenet of contract law35 because it has all the ear-
marks of a natural law, premised on the innate selfishness of
human nature.3 6
33. Many scholars have challenged contract law's hostility to altruism. See Jay
A. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 839-42
(1983) (arguing that the individualist vision in contract law does not accurately
portray society's aspirations and leads to inconsistencies and unanswered questions);
see also Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1717-22 (arguing that altruism is in constant
competition with individualism).
34. Macneil disputes the promissory basis of contract theory and its adherence
to a model of discrete and fully negotiated transactional exchanges. He argues that
a network of interdependency exists in a postindustrialized society and parties deal
with each other for many years, entailing the reinterpretation of contract as a series
of long-term relational exchanges not strictly based on monetary quid pro quos. See
Macneil, supra note 32, passim.
35. Grant Gilmore has argued that the doctrine of consideration was an
invention of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., whose "analysis of the true meaning of
'consideration' comes forth almost naked of citation of authority or precedent."
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 20-21 (1974). In Gilmore's view,
consideration has decreasing importance as the fields of contract and tort "are
gradually merging and becoming one." Id. at 88.
36. Adam Smith wrote:
But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in
vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to
prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew [sic] them that
it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever
offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which
I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such
offer ....
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In assuming that individuals exist in a state of separation
from others, bargain theory limits the possibilities of human
relationships and free choice by not acknowledging that there
is a chance that we can also appreciate and identify with
another's needs. We can, at times, behave altruistically in
furtherance of what are believed to be shared and inter-
dependent goals. The contract cases involving caretakers belie
the theory's refined tone of social Darwinism. They are living
proof of our natural desire for attachment and our innate
capacity to embrace another's interests as our own.
B. Denial of Altruism
in the Caretaker Contract Cases
One of the most revealing examples of contract's approach
to altruistic caring is the classic case of Mills v. Wyman, in
which a caretaker brought a penniless twenty-five-year-old
into his home, nursed him, and provided him with shelter
until his death. When the youth's father was informed of his
son's death, he wrote to the caretaker, promising to reimburse
him for his expenses. Subsequently, the father refused to pay
for the care.38 Although the caretaker had formed a family
relationship with the father and son by responding to the
youth's dependency needs, the court unraveled the relational
triad created by the parties and recast them as three separate
and independent individualists by refusing to enforce the
father's promise. The law alienated the closest and most
enduring of family attachments, that between parent and
child. Father and son were reborn as unrelated strangers.
The court would not interfere with the father's autonomy by
assuming he valued his son's welfare, 39 or disturb the auton-
omy of the son, who as an adult was considered to be self-
reliant and responsible for his own needs.4" Although the
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
14 (Edwin Cannan ed., The Modern Library 1937) (1776).
37. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825).
38. Id. at 209.
39. The court wrote: "It is only when the party making the promise gains
something, or he to whom it is made loses something, that the law gives the promise
validity." Id. at 210.
40. The court explained:
A legal obligation is always a sufficient consideration to support either an
express or an implied promise; such as an infant's debt for necessaries, or a
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court perceived enforcing the promise in Mills as an unwar-
ranted public interference with a personal, moral obligation
and a private, family concern, 4' the state in effect regulated
the family by setting limits on the duty to care for and to be
responsible for a child's needs.42 The opinion resigns itself to
the frailties of human nature. According to the court, the
father is morally obligated to reward the caretaker's altruism
and can voluntarily take on responsibility for another's
needs,43 but the law cannot demand perfection. The rules
chosen by the court reflect a normative standard of social
behavior, not an ethical ideal:
What a man ought to do, generally he ought to be made to
do, whether he promise or refuse. But the law of society
has left most of such obligations to the interior forum, as
the tribunal of conscience has been aptly called."
Actually, the conduct of the parties demonstrated a fatal
abundance of altruism. In caring for the youth, the caretaker
did not consider himself, while the father's letter of gratitude,
father's promise to pay for the support and education of his minor children. But
when the child shall have attained to manhood, and shall have become his own
agent in the world's business, the debts he incurs, whatever may be their
nature, create no obligation upon the father ....
Id. at 211.
41. Id. at 210.
42. From a historical perspective, Mills is not based on modern notions of
consideration or on contract but on the distinction drawn in the 19th century between
moral duties and legal obligations. English contract law before the 19th century
centered on partially executed contracts. Duties arose from receipt of a benefit or
another's detrimental reliance. See P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT 184 (1979). A man was also obligated to pay for goods and services
received by members of his family and household because he had a legal duty of care
towards them. Id. at 182-83; see Jenkins v. Tucker, 126 Eng. Rep. 55 (1788) (holding
a husband liable to his father-in-law for the funeral expenses of his wife). The duty
to care for one's children ends at the age of majority; for that reason the father in
Mills was not liable. Mills, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) at 211-12.
The separation of law from morality is in itself a value statement implicitly linked
to contract. The will theory of contract and liability based on a promise-dominant
features of the 19th-century classical era-reflect a belief in the value of free choice,
well-suited to the rise of an increasingly industrialized society and laissez-faire
economy. ATTYAH, supra, at 40-41. As a precursor of the times, Mills proclaims the
new age of individualism, and contractual relationships based on the freedom to
choose one's obligations. Mills is a transitional case, looking forward to contract and
backward to tort.
43. Mills, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) at 210.
44. Id.
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in which he promised compensation, was not in exchange for
the father's own care. Altruism exists in Mills. It is the law
that is inadequate to recognize it.
Eventually courts were able to devise a workable method to
provide compensation for deserving caretakers without
acknowledging altruism or interfering with what has become
contract's standard technique for protecting free choice, the
bargain theory. In Webb v. McGowin,45 an employee diverted
the fall of a seventy-five-pound pine block to prevent it from
striking his employer, injuring himself in the process. The
employee was permanently disabled, suffering a broken arm
and leg and the loss of the heel of his right foot. The employer
agreed to care for the employee for the remainder of the
employee's life, and paid him fifteen dollars every two weeks
for more than eight years. When the employer died, however,
his estate refused to continue the payments. The employee
sued, claiming he had been promised an annuity for the rest
of his life. The court concluded that there would have been a
bargain if there had been time for the parties to negotiate, and
therefore granted recovery.4" The court found a bargain by
noting the employer's conduct after the accident and overtly
weighing the value of the employee's performance.47 Saving
the employer's life gratified basic survival needs, and the
payment of the annuity for so many years suggested that the
employer intended to honor his promise. There is no fear of
45. 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935), cert. denied, 168 So. 199 (Ala. 1936).
46. The court reasoned that "McGowin's express promise to pay appellant for the
services rendered was an affirmance or ratification of what appellant had done
raising the presumption that the services had been rendered at McGowin's request."
Id. at 198.
Charles Fried considers the court's finding of a bargained exchange in Webb "too
strained to repeat." CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 32-33 (1981). Fried
would enforce donative promises because serious promises create expectations that
should be honored. Id. at 37. He grounds contract theory in an ethic of respect for
individual autonomy, id. at 16, and free choice. Id. at 20. However, Fried does not
sufficiently allow for disparity in bargaining strengths and the degree to which one's
socioeconomic position determines one's bargaining power.
47. The court stated, "The averments of the complaint show that appellant saved
McGowin from death or grievous bodily harm. This was a material benefit to him of
infinitely more value than any financial aid he could have received." Id. at 197. As
Webb illustrates, modern bargain theory inevitably collapses into evaluations of the
objective value of the promise or performance or inquiries concerning the subjective
intent of the parties. See generally Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of
Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1077-78 (1985) (arguing that the court's
determination of mutual advantage may end up providing the requisite manifestation
of intent to bargain).
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imposing an unwanted benefit on an unwilling recipient. As
long as the autonomy of the recipient is protected, there is
room in contract for compensating services that are performed
before a promise has been made.48  Restitution affords relief
to caretakers who act with the expectation of financial gain
and bestow measurable benefits.49
48. In contrast with Mills, the employer was found to be morally obligated to
honor his promise. "It is well settled that a moral obligation is a sufficient
consideration to support a subsequent promise to pay where the promisor has
received a material benefit, although there was no original duty or liability resting
on the promisor." Webb, 168 So. at 198.
The moral obligation doctrine emerged in eighteenth-century English contract law
as part of a general system of duties imposed by law. Lord Mansfield created the
doctrine to cover cases in which a promisor received a benefit and refused to pay. A
promise to pay a legal duty (such as a debt discharged by the statute of limitations),
an equitable duty (a claim recognized in the Court of Chancery), and a moral duty
were equally enforceable, not solely because of the promise, but also because the
courts believed the promisor should pay for the benefits or acts of reliance. These
cases were eventually overruled in the 19th century. See ATIYAH, supra note 42, at
162-64. Although this doctrine was premised on underlying moral duties, enforcing
these promises was also a part of the development of a promise-based liability
because there was no duty in the absence of a promise. Id. at 163-64.
Despite attempts to discredit the doctrine, however, some courts continued to
invoke substantive moral consideration. See Stanley D. Henderson, Promises
Grounded in the Past: The Idea of Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contracts, 57
VA. L. REV. 1115, 1123-26 (1971). Actually, there is no difference between the moral
obligation doctrine and the modern theory of unjust enrichment. Restitution
expresses an underlying morality that valuable benefits should not be retained
without compensation. There are limits, however, to restitution's definition of moral-
ity. Obligations do not extend to benefits bestowed on others, as shown in Mills.
49. The Restatement of Contracts states:
(1) A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the
promisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent
injustice.
(2) A promise is not binding under Subsection (1)
(a) if the promisee conferred the benefit as a gift or for other reasons the
promisor has not been unjustly enriched; or
(b) to the extent that its value is disproportionate to the benefit.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1981).
A promise made after receipt of a benefit is thought to remove an objection which
might otherwise bar quasi-contractual relief. See Robert Braucher, Freedom of
Contract and the Second Restatement, 78 YALE L.J. 598, 605 (1969). The promise
serves the same evidentiary function as in pre-19th century contract law. In
§ 86(2)(b) a court is given discretion to evaluate the content of the bargain to ensure
that the promise is commensurate with the value of the services. The court may
either honor the promise if it is a fair assessment of the services or disregard it if it
seems too generous in light of the work performed. See infra note 56 (discussing
variations in outcomes, depending on the court's estimate of the worth of the
services). In cases in which the caretaker does not claim an express promise,
recovery is also the market value of the services whether the legal theory happens
to be quasi-contract (implied-in-law) or on the contract (implied-in-fact). In all these
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From the employee's perspective in Webb, however, the
contract is nonreciprocal. It is unlikely he acted with the
expectation of a reward, induced to bargain away the heel of
his foot and his ability to earn a living in return for an
annuity of thirty dollars a month. A rational market maxi-
mizer would not increase his survival risks in exchange for
a promise of a relatively small amount of money to be paid
over time. ° The employee was really granted tort compen-
sation in Webb.5 He acted against his own interest, incur-
ring injuries and suffering a serious loss. The employer also
acted against his own interest, because he initiated the
payments after the rescue occurred.52 What was in fact a
caring and compassionate relationship between employer and
employee was reframed 5" as one of self-interest to comport
with the rules of bargain. Just as the law estranges a father
and son, seeing them as incapable of sharing the same
interests, so too it disconnects an employer and employee and
cases, courts measure the extent of the plaintiffs loss in order to quantify the
recipient's gain, a tort-based form of recovery. For a discussion of the lack of
distinction in restitution between contracts implied-in-fact and quasi-contracts, see
Henderson, supra note 48, at 1147-48.
50. Richard Posner would enforce the employer's promise because its present
value is greater if the promise is legally binding. If not enforceable, the employer
might be forced into making a lump sum payment with a lower present value than
the promised monthly annuity. See Posner, supra note 29, at 49. This analysis is not
significantly different from the court's approach in Webb. There is an assumption
that both parties are better off financially as a result of the commodity exchange and
that self-interest motivated the parties into negotiating a commercial bargain. See
Webb, 168 So. at 198.
51. At the time of the lawsuit, the employee had received his full entitlement of
workers' compensation benefits. FARNSWORTH, supra note 13, § 2.8, at 58 n.27. The
only way for the court to provide further compensation was to find a bargain. Webb
was not entitled to recover in restitution because, as a nonprofessional who acted
spontaneously, his services are presumed gratuitous in the absence of proof of an
intent to charge. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 114 cmt. c, illus. 8 (1937).
52. The executors of McGowin's estate contended that the employer never
explicitly promised to pay the employee. Rather, as president of the company that
employed Webb, he generously arranged for the employee to receive payments after
workers' compensation benefits had terminated. FARNSWORTH, supra note 13, § 2.8,
at 58 n.27.
53. The facts, the raw data of reality, are not innately ordered, but instead are
choreographed by courts and lawyers in a certain time-frame and space, often with
the history and circumstances of the parties carefully selected. For an analysis of
various interpretive constructs and how they are used to order facts in such a way
as to reach the "logical" legal result, see Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in
the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981). See also Jay M.
Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARv. L. REV. 678, 698-708
(1984).
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positions them into fixed social roles, disabling both from
coming together in a personal relationship.54
In long-term relationships, there is more likely to be a
claim for compensation for services than in a case of momen-
tary rescue. The services involve a greater investment of
time and effort over a longer period, and loss is more acutely
felt when a relationship that has lasted for years finally
ends. During the relationship, however, there is little
concern with gain or loss, and for that reason the caretakers
are altruists.55 Personal services that continue for many
years are difficult to reconcile with bargain theory. Often
care is provided to elderly and/or lonely recipients who
eventually die intestate or who fail to mention the caretakers
in their wills. Courts are compelled to choose between the
competing policies of preventing unjust enrichment and
honoring testamentary intent.56 Moreover, the caretakers
54. During the colonial period, an employer's duty to his employees was the same
as a father's duty to care for his children. A master stood in loco parentis to his
servants. MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860, at 207-08 (1977). As an impersonal factory system gradually replaced
personal apprenticeships, the law turned from familial relationships to contract
theory, and courts began to rule that employees assumed the risks of injury in
exchange for their wages. Id. at 208-09. As Richard Fischl has noted:
[T]here is often more to our connection with our working colleagues than the
mere fact that we work shoulder-to-shoulder in pursuit of a living; we should
expect some measure or mix of love, empathy, solidarity, or commitment to
principle to come into play as well.
Fischl, supra note 25, at 859.
55. See infra text accompanying note 88.
56. Courts vary in whether or not to honor a non-testamentary promise,
depending on their evaluation of the service's worth and their degree of confidence
in the promisor's subjective intent. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a
decedent's $25,000 promissory note to his caretaker despite the administrator's
insistence that the services were worth far less than the face amount of the note.
In re Hatten's Estate, 288 N.W. 278, 285-87 (Wis. 1939); see infra notes 59-65 and
accompanying text (discussing In re Hatten's Estate). The next year, however, two
caretakers, a mother and a daughter, who took care of their son-in-law and brother-
in-law, his children, and his home for ten years, were unsuccessful in maintaining
that their services were worth more than the notes of $2,000. In re Schoenkerman's
Estate, 294 N.W. 810, 811-12 (Wis. 1940). Similarly, in another case a woman for
many years provided friendship, housework, meals, and laundry to a boarder who
eventually died intestate and without heirs. The caretaker's claim of an oral
promise to leave her the entire estate was denied and she was granted $2,338.00,
the reasonable value of her services. In re Estate of Gerke, 73 N.W.2d 506, 507,
509 (Wis. 1955). In yet another case, a $5,000 check given to the caretaker was
considered an invalid testamentary transfer. The caretaker, Jean Moore, had
taken the elderly woman shopping, done her laundry, occasionally cooked her
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in these cases are usually women 57 whose domestic services,
the commodity they provide to the relationship, are con-
sidered to be of little or uncertain value. The relationship, as
indicated by its duration, is personal-the opposite of a
discrete and adversarial negotiation. 8
In the case of In re Hatten's Estate,59 Beatrice Monsted
befriended and cared for a bachelor friend for twenty-five
years. After his death, she filed a claim against his estate to
enforce a $25,000 promissory note. To allow recovery, the
court decided that the caretaker acted with the intent and
the expectation to be paid.6 ° The material services provided
by the woman furnished valuable consideration for the
promissory note, despite the woman's testimony which
suggests that she acted out of friendship and affection,
ministering to the lonely man's need for companionship:
"On one occasion Mr. Hatten came up there and laid
down on the studio couch. He claimed his hotel room
was very cold and he would be almost frozen. I would
start the fire in the fireplace and he would go on the
couch and fall asleep. This night I came down in the
morning and he was still there. Several times in the
evening he would fall asleep and I would let him lie there
and would call my son and he would come over. Once it
bothered me because he was sleeping so soundly. I called
up my son and had him look him over and he said, 'he is
having the sleep of his life, let him sleep and I will come
over later.' Mr. Hatten was very sensitive. I would have
my son drop in, not letting him know he was coming
meals, and visited her on a daily basis. She had looked after her until her death.
In re Estate of Tulley, 273 N.W.2d 329, 331-32 (Wis. 1979).
57. My research on caretaker cases, comprising more than 150 cases, revealed
relatively few claims pursued by men. Males occasionally adopt the role ofcaregiver,
however. See, e.g., Poe v. Estate of Levy, 411 So. 2d 253, 254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (involving a male cohabitant who claimed an express agreement in which he
would receive a share in a woman's property in return for providing her personal
services); Twiford v. Waterfield, 83 S.E.2d 548, 548 (N.C. 1954) (involving a foster son
who claimed recovery for the reasonable value of the services rendered to his foster
mother).
58. See Macneil, supra note 32, at 732-33. The longer the parties are involved
with each other, the more the motivations of friendship, altruism, and various
psychological and sociological factors enter into the relationship. Id. at 733.
59. 288 N.W. 278 (Wis. 1940).
60. Id. at 285.
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there to take him home. On that occasion he slept on the
studio couch in the library.
"I was asked, 'You weren't doing it with the expectation
of getting money?' And I answered, 'No sir, I wasn't doing
it expecting to receive money at that time, although I felt
as though what we did for him I should be paid. I did not
feel as though I could afford to take him out in my car as
much as I did.'" 6'
The caretaker did not expect to profit from the relationship.
However, compensation necessitates that the court defend her
as a self-interested wealth maximizer, while the dissent
argues she acted out of selflessness.62 Altruism, a moral
norm that many would agree is socially desirable, is placed at
odds with justice.
The elderly man in In re Hatten's Estate was really con-
sidered to be a member of the family. As in Mills, the law's
approach denies de facto kinship. To recognize the true
nature of the relationship would oblige the court to acknowl-
edge the woman's lack of self-interest, and, therefore, deny
recovery because, under existing law, services are presumed
61. Id. at 289.
62. Id. at 289 (Fowler, J., dissenting).
63. The court wrote:
It is not disputed that close friendly relations existed between Mr. Hatten
and the claimant and her family for more than twenty-five years. During all
of those years he frequently was invited to the Monsted home and often went
there without formal invitation .... In many respects, he treated the Monsted
home as though it were his own.
In re Hatten's Estate, 288 N.W. at 281.
There are numerous examples of caretakers and recipients forming a family
relationship other than that of husband and wife. See, e.g., In re Estate of Bennett,
529 P.2d 338, 339 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974) (describing a housekeeper caring for an
elderly woman for five years as if she were the woman's daughter); In re Estate of
Milborn, 461 N.E.2d 1075, 1077, 1079 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984) (reporting that for five
years a husband and wife cooked all the decedent's meals, cleaned her home, mowed
her lawn, transported her to the doctor, and loved her as a member of their family);
Embry v. Estate of Martz, 377 S.W.2d 367, 369-70 (Mo. 1964) (stating that a care-
taker and her husband took care of an elderly man's house and performed his farm
chores'for more than ten years, considering him to be an uncle); Morris v. Retz, 413
S.W.2d 544, 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (describing a woman caring for a physician as
his nurse and housekeeper, until his death at the age of ninety); In re Estate of Zent,
459 N.W.2d 795, 799 (N.D. 1990) (stating that for three years the woman was
babysitter to a man suffering from Alzheimer's disease who could not dress himself,
bathe, or take his medicine without her help).
Redefining the Family
gratuitous in the family.' The presumption can be over-
come, but only at the expense of separating the relatives into
arms-length commercial strangers. By narrowly limiting
the meaning of family and the altruism it stands for, courts
avoid a contradiction with the paradigm of the social compact,
a public, social world composed of isolated individualists with
uncommon, competing interests. As a result, a positive aspect
of human nature, unselfish caring, is remodeled to suit a
bargain regime premised on the inherently selfish nature of
the individual. The bargain reifies what is created by its own
terms. It is a procrustean bed, molding the parties and their
relationships to fit within its behavioral presuppositions.
If there is a sexual relationship between the parties, a host
of gender issues are raised that only are resolved by proof of
strenuous and exceptional services, capable of standing on
their own apart from the intimate relationship."R In re Estate
64. See, e.g., Neumann v. Rogstad, 757 P.2d 761, 764 (Mont. 1988); In re Estate of
Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 702 (Wis. 1980); Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 KB. 571, 577.
65. Specifically, the presumption of gratuity can be rebutted if the services are
extremely arduous and time-consuming and the degree of kinship is somewhat
distant. See, e.g., Wilhoite v. Beck, 230 N.E.2d 616, 620-23 (Ind. App. 1967) (holding
that second cousins who lived in the same house for twenty years did not treat each
other as family and intended that the services be reimbursed); In re Estate of
Beecham, 378 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Minn. 1985) (compensating a daughter-in-law for
onerous nursing services beyond what is usually owed to a mother-in-law); In re
Estate of Raketti, 340 N.W.2d 894, 902 (N.D. 1983) (allowing a sister successfully to
claim an implied contract with her deceased sister for payment of services because
the two had lived apart for many years and each had a separate family life).
Some courts insist on proof of an express contract. See, e.g., West v. West, 229
S.W.2d 451, 453 (Ky. 1950). Others allow recovery on an implied contract but require
proof by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Harrison v. Harrison, 75 So. 2d 620,
623 (Ala. 1954). In service cases between strangers the plaintiff need not prove an
expectation of a reward. The law presumes both self-interest and the expectation of
compensation if there has been a request for services. The burden to bring forth facts
to rebut the presumption is on the recipient who accepted the services. See, e.g., In
re Estate of Steffes, 290 N.W.2d at 702; Wojahn v. National Union Bank, 129 N.W.
1068, 1077 (Wis. 1911). The pervasive influence of the market/family dichotomy is
the reason there is no need to prove an expectation of financial gain in these cases,
as well as the reason why the caretaker must prove self-interest if related to the
recipient or if the parties are living together. See Olsen, supra note 8, at 1504-05.
66. Feminist scholars have described the plight of a woman who claims
recognition of a contract in the context of a "meretricious" relationship and have
brought our attention to the complexity of all social life, part intimate and part
commercial. They have underscored both the economic basis of all family relation-
ships, obscured by the family/market dichotomy, and the inability to draw distinct
lines between the public and private spheres. For a discussion of cohabitation cases
and theories of recovery, see Dalton, supra note 47, at 1097-1113; Martha L.
Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-Marital
Cohabitation, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 275,323-25; Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common
Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829 (1987).
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of Steffes67 involved a caretaker who lived with a farmer,
Virgil Steffes, for approximately six years. Mary Lou Brooks
cleaned and cooked, washed and ironed, fixed fences, picked
corn, loaded silage, poured concrete, tore down partitions,
wrote out checks, and prepared farm machinery for sale.
When Steffes was diagnosed with cancer, she drove him to the
hospital for twenty-eight consecutive days for his cobalt
treatments. 8 As he lay dying, she refused to allow him to
suffer the indignity of a catheter. The caretaker sat beside his
bed with a bedpan and if he was unable to use it, changed his
sheets and bedclothing. She physically carried him when he
could no longer walk. Although he had wanted to financially
provide for her and to leave her the house and farm, Steffes
died without memorializing his intent in a will.69
The court, in affirming the finding of an implied-in-law and
implied-in-fact agreement," neatly severed the relationship
into two parts. In its attempt to de-emphasize the relation-
ship's sexual aspects, the court ignored its emotional content
and evaluated only the commercial services provided to the
farmer.7' According to the court, the caretaker performed the
Clare Dalton suggests that Carol Gilligan's work on the psychology of moral
development and Nancy Chodorow's psychoanalytic theory might provide further
understanding of these cases. Dalton, supra note 47, at 1112-13.
67. 290 N.W.2d 697 (Wis. 1980).
68. Id. at 699.
69. Id. at 700. Various witnesses testified that Virgil Steffes intended that Mary
Lou Brooks receive his property. However, he sold part of the farm and conveyed an
option to buy the farm property to purchasers before he died. Id. Even if the
recipient does name the caretaker as a beneficiary in his will, she may experience
problems because the relationship often influences courts to believe the woman has
exercised undue influence. See Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentary Gifts Resulting
from Meretricious Relationships: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 200, 201 (1989).
70. Steffes, 290 N.W.2d at 709. The theoretical distinction between consensually
based recovery (the circumstances suggest a tacit agreement) and recovery imposed
by law (unjust enrichment) blurs in the facts.
71. The court followed the reasoning in Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal.
1976). Steffes, 290 N.W.2d at 706-08. Marvin established that personal services
other than sexual services can provide lawful consideration for an express or implied
agreement to pool all earnings and share all property acquired. Marvin, 557 P.2d at
116. Marvin also proposed various other legal theories as grounds for recovery,
including implied partnership agreements or joint venture, a constructive or resulting
trust, or quantum meruit (recovery for the reasonable value of the services less the
reasonable value of support if it is shown the services were rendered with the
expectation of financial gain). Id. at 122-23.
The court in Steffes rejected the personal representative's contention that a
presumption of gratuitous services applied because the parties were involved in a
close family relationship and that such a presumption only could be rebutted by proof
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labors of Hercules out of self-interest. Only because she
intended to be compensated for performing the work of a
professional nurse and farmhand was she awarded $14,600,
the reasonable value of the services.72 A more believable
justification for the decision to compensate is Mary Lou
Brooks's reliance on Steffes. She assumed that he would
provide for her future and she believed that the farm was her
home.73
Not all jurisdictions allow a caretaker to recover if there is
only a claim of an implied agreement. In Artache v. Goldin,4
the parties lived together for fourteen years. In that time, the
caretaker, Carmen Artache, was a traditional wife, working in
the home and raising their four children. She also assisted
the recipient, Jerrold Goldin, in his dental practice. Some of
the more than $60,000 she had received through the settle-
ment of a personal injury action and the sale of real property
was used as a down payment on the family residence.75
Although separated from his wife when the parties began
living together, Goldin did not officially dissolve his marriage
of an express contract. Steffes, 290 N.W.2d at 702-03. The court stated that it was
unnecessary to decide whether a presumption arose. The final determination
depends on the circumstances. Id. at 703. The trial court determined that despite
a loving relationship between the parties, the plaintiff expected payment, and the
deceased expressed an intent to compensate her. Id. at 704. If a promise to pay can
be implied from the facts, "the plaintiff is entitled to compensation regardless of the
fact that she rendered services with a sense of affection, devotion and duty." Id. The
work performed by the plaintiff as housekeeper, bookkeeper, farmhand, and nurse
was unpleasant, and some of the labor was commercial in nature. She worked long
hours and testified that she expected to be paid. Id.
Marvin noted that personal services can be considered contribution for purposes
of recovering a proportionate share in the property without presuming a gift is
intended: "There is no more reason to presume that services are contributed as a gift
than to presume that funds are contributed as a gift; in any event the better
approach is to presume. . . 'that the parties intend to deal fairly with each other.'"
Marvin, 557 P.2d at 121 (Peters, J., dissenting) (quoting Keene v. Keene, 371 P.2d
329, 339 (Cal. 1962)). The court's refusal to presume a gratuitous intent in a claim
of an implied contract in Steffes is in keeping with the Marvin court's broad principle
of honoring the equitable and legitimate expectations of trading parties, despite the
presence of an intimate relationship. The approach in Steffes-traditional
commercial interest analysis-furnishes a solution to the problem of quasi-family
status. There is not enough family to allow for a claim to share in the assets of the
estate at death, but there is too much family to demand recovery in contract for
services rendered.
72. Steffes, 290 N.W.2d at 698.
73. She testified that she did not expect compensation for her work but that she
did expect to receive something from the farmer. Id. at 710 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
74. 519 N.Y.S.2d 702 (App. Div. 1987).
75. Id. at 704-05.
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until he decided to end his relationship with Carmen Artache.
He left the residence they shared, disavowed paternity, and
served Carmen Artache and the children with a ten-day notice
to quit the premises. 7  The caretaker claimed an oral part-
nership agreement in which she and Goldin agreed to live
together and hold themselves out as married. She also
claimed that he had promised to divorce his wife and share
the profits of his practice and other business interests if she
would raise the children, take care of their home, and work in
the office.77 The court deferred to the state legislature and
refused to recognize the right to compensation based upon an
implied agreement to live together outside of wedlock.7"
Carmen Artache was allowed to proceed to trial to prove an
express agreement entitling her to the reasonable value of her
domestic and dental assistance services, less any salary
received.79  The court also denied an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because of the nature of the
relationship. 0 Carmen Artache was not enough of a wife to
acquire a share in marital assets8 ' but was too closely
related to sue for the pain she suffered over the loss of her
family, her home, and her financial security. 2 Caught
76. Id. at 705.
77. Id. at 704.
78. Id. at 706. The court further cited to the Morone case. See Morone v.
Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that in the absence of an express
contract it is reasonable to assume the services are gratuitous because of the close
relationship). The framing of the relationship as one between intimates precludes
courts from inferring an arms-length commercial contract. "[C]onduct that in other
circumstances would give rise to an implied-in-fact contract is instead attributed to
the relationship." Dalton, supra note 47, at 1098. Some jurisdictions, however, do
allow an action for an implied-in-fact agreement if it is based on commercial services,
not housework. See, e.g., Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747, 751-52 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981).
79. Artache, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
80. Id.
81. Instead, as parties in a fiduciary relationship, a constructive trust could be
imposed to protect her interest in some of Goldin's assets, including the home held
in his name. The trial court was also directed to entertain her paternity and child
support claims. Id.
82. The relationship between cohabitants is frequently construed as both too
public and too private for court intervention. See Dalton, supra note 47, at
1098-1100 (deconstructing the various private/public law arguments used to deny
recovery to cohabitants and arguing that they are inconclusive); see also Kandoian,
supra note 66, at 1839-40 (discussing the indeterminacy inherent in cohabitation
disputes). The application of any existing source of authority, be it family law or
contract law, is subjective. How the relationship is framed is not governed by a set
of rules. The parties' intent to contract or the legislature's intent in abolishing
common-law marriage cannot be divined.
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between public laws regulating the family and private rules of
contract and tort, the caretaker is dispatched to somewhere in
the middle-quantum meruit s3
Steffes and Artache avoid recognition of the nontraditional
family, and, implicitly, morally condemn nonmarital intimacy
by enforcing only the legitimate commercial expectations of
parties who, as business partners, just happen to live together.
Any severable portion of the contract supported by indepen-
dent consideration other than sexual services is enforceable. 4
An alternate approach, taken by some courts, is to include the
sexual services in the agreement as long as they are not the
only or primary consideration. 5 Both methods, although
sensitive to contemporary mores and careful not to equate a
nonmarital relationship to prostitution, nevertheless assume
there is a sexual quid pro quo, whether it is compensable or
not. Illicit commerce is taking place.
Neither approach recognizes that the caretaker's services
(sexual, emotional, domestic, or otherwise) cannot be appor-
tioned or ranked as disjointed items. They are incapable of
being unfastened from the moorings of the relationship as
disassociated and viable commodities. Rather, the services are
natural expressions of caring, and create the very fabric of an
intimate relationship. A caretaker only incidentally provides
market services, often acting in response to the affective need
to be emotionally connected to another human being. Never-
theless, courts transform the relationship into a discrete
impersonal commodity exchange, discounting its real value,
the caring. The commercial ware that the recipient barters for
is housework, for which there is an unestablished fair market
value.
The analysis in the caretaker cases proceeds as if dominion
and control over a commodity-labor-has passed from the
83. I spoke with Albert Silbowitz, one of the attorneys on the case, who informed
me that the parties still await a trial date. Carmen Artache became emotionally
upset when she arrived at the blood lab and refused to allow her children to submit
to blood tests to determine paternity. Her claim for child support has been
dismissed. Telephone Interview with Albert Silbowitz, Attorney for Jerrold Goldin
(Oct. 22, 1991).
84. Artache, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
85. See, e.g., Latham v. Latham, 547 P.2d 144, 147 (Or. 1976) ("The agreement
. . contemplated all the burdens and amenities of married life."). Minnesota has
recognized written agreements between cohabitants by statute. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 513.075 (West 1990). New Hampshire considers three years of cohabitation to be
a legal marriage. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1983). A few jurisdictions still
refuse recognition of any contract claim. See, e.g., Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81,
82 (Ga. 1977); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979).
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possession of one individual to another. Moreover, the act of
transferring labor is isolated out of context as occurring at an
identifiable moment, separable from the parties and their past
and future relationship.86 At that moment, courts attempt to
plumb the caretaker's subjective state of mind in order to
discern whether she contemplated a return. In reality, the
caretaker does not transfer the possession of a fungible item
in one concrete instance, but over time gives of herself by
bestowing care. Because her behavior is kinetically tied to the
tenor of the relationship, she is motivated by relational
interests, not self-interest. It is not a promise of economic
gain that causes her to care for the recipient; she acts out of
love. 7 For that reason, her conduct is altruistic.88
It is not difficult to reconstruct the real world scenarios
reflected in these cases. The caretaker is lulled into a feeling
of economic security. It seems natural to confine her inter-
ests to the home, leaving business affairs in the hands of the
recipient. She mistakenly relies on his verbal assurances
and behavior, both of which suggest an intent to provide
financially for her future.89 What is missing is negotiation,
86. See supra note 53 for an analysis of the "framing" of facts; see also Coombs,
supra note 27, at 1632-35.
87. Given the socioeconomic dependency of women, contracts in which they agree
to exchange domestic services for economic security are likely to occur. Nevertheless,
I believe that even in these cases some women are more likely to conceptualize their
relationships as built on altruistic caring and giving because that is the way they
subjectively experience them. Case law provides evidence that women in these
contexts do not always think in transactional terms. See, e.g., Kozlowski v.
Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 906 (N.J. 1979) (upholding an express promise to support
the caretaker after fifteen years of living together during which the caretaker was
unaware of the promisor's business interests or the worth of his assets and had no
possessions other than what he had given her).
88. In suggesting that the caretaker is an altruist, I do not attempt to recreate
the family/market dichotomy elegantly explained and criticized by Professor Olsen.
See Olsen, supra note 8, at 1499-1500. I simply argue that caretakers do not
necessarily think contractually. As Professor Olsen maintained in her article, there
are no hard and fast rules in life governing boundaries on motivation. See id. at
1522-24, 1563-67.
89. See, e.g., Williams v. Mason, 556 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (Miss. 1990) (concerning
a caretaker who lived with the recipient for twenty years after he promised 'that, if
she would live in his home and do his bidding, at his death she would take all of his
property"); Johnston v. Estate of Phillips, 706 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(concerning a caretaker who stayed with the recipient for ten years, where the
recipient stated before various witnesses that "[i]fsomething happens to me Margaret
will be taken care of.... I have provided for Margaret when I am gone."); Kinkenon
v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Neb. 1981) (concerning a fifty-two-year-old woman who
lived with the recipient for seven years and testified that she agreed to move to the
farm because the "appellant stated that he had the means and would take care of and
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an expression of self-interested commercial foresight and
the crux of an impersonal market exchange.
When the relationship ends and the parties are no longer
emotionally interconnected, the caretaker becomes aware of
her sacrifice and effort to benefit another and experiences a
sense of loss. The time she spent caring for the recipient was
given at the expense of skills she could have acquired, money
she could have earned, and financial security she might have
obtained. To the caretaker, justice requires that the recipient
be held responsible for her loss because they were in a
relationship. Believing that a relationship is more important
than abstract rights, and that obligations extend past narrow
principles of reciprocity, a caretaker is unable to express
herself in language that a court would understand. In fact,
her work in the home without pay, foregoing other economic
opportunities, could leave her without the financial resources
necessary to pursue a lawsuit. Her values and her social
situation work against her economic long-term interests.
If the caretaker is financially able to bring an action against
the recipient or his estate, she must allege a contract. Courts
do not understand the caretaker's relational perspective and
ethic of care, her dependence on someone else to take responsi-
bility for financial needs. Instead of acknowledging the
caretaker's altruism, her economic dependency, and the
recipient's emotional needs, courts insist on positioning the
parties within a bargain exchange. They are transformed into
adversarial strangers, dealing with each other across a
bargaining table and tenuously linked through the formalized
mechanism of mutual inducement, instead of intimates who
have bonded together to create a family. The finding of a
bargain exchange commodifies what is an expression of the
caretaker's self in a relationship into the transference of a
thing-labor. ° The court denies that which is most personal
provide for her for the rest of her life"); McCullon v. McCullon, 410 N.Y.S.2d 226, 233
(Sup. Ct. 1978) (finding that the recipient's twenty-eight years of supporting the
caretaker, and his statement "that he would always care for her, resulted in her
forbearance of employment and providing household services for him"); York v. Place,
544 P.2d 572, 573 (Or. 1975) (finding that "decedent had stated to other persons that
at his death the farm would go to plaintiff"); Knauer v. Knauer, 470 A.2d 553, 555
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (concerning a recipient who told the caretaker "I will take care
of you the rest of your life. We will share everything together. And at the end of one
year, if we are still compatible, we would plan to marry.").
90. For a discussion of the commodification of personal attributes focusing on
surrogate mothering and prostitution, see Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability,
100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1921-36 (1987).
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and definitive of the self: the capacity to love and to take
care of another. It alienates people from the very qualities
that distinguish us as human beings. Both persons become
dehumanized, separated from their personal characteristics
as well as from each other.
As Margaret Radin points out, individualism is premised on
conceptualizing each person as an abstract, autonomous agent,
emphasizing our differences, but equality is achieved by
eliminating those personal qualities that define each individ-
ual as unique. Once personal traits are disconnected from
personhood, it becomes easier to perceive them as mere items,
possessions that can be severed and alienated away.s' The
person is estranged from the self. In these cases, the law's
reluctance to accept the parties in their real social context
violates that which forms the personality and enables person-
hood to thrive: the capacity to become emotionally involved
with another. Empathy, experiencing another's needs as a
part of the self, is integral to the concept of personhood.
A court sympathetic to the caretaker's financial plight has
no choice but to misstate the relationship in order to avoid
compensating services which are the legal equivalent of a
gift. 2 To ensure that the bestowal of services was not the
fully executed delivery of a gift, the caretaker must have acted
with the purpose of receiving a monetary gain. Reciprocity
also requires that the services be valuable. Value depends on
the nature of the relationship. If the services cannot provide
consideration because they are evaluated as gratuitous or
illegal, any express promise of payment is only an unenforce-
able promise to bestow a gift. A court will not find an implied
promise of compensation and an expectation to be paid
because of the characterization of the relationship.93 Under
this system, the only way to establish value and allow for
91. Id. at 1897.
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86(2)(a) (1981) (denying
compensation if the benefit was bestowed as a gift). Enrichment is not "unjust" if the
benefit is intended to be a gift. In such an instance, there needs to be a finding of an
intent or expectation to be paid even if there is proof of an express promise of pay-
ment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 cmt. e (1981); see also Wade,
supra note 12, at 1183.
93. See Artache v. Goldin, 519 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706 (App. Div. 1987) (noting that
the state does not recognize the right to receive compensation based on an implied
agreement to live together outside of marriage); see also Dalton, supra note 47, at
1017 (commenting on the refusal to infer an implied contract from the behavior of the
parties in these cases, although the same behavior usually suggests a contract
outside the family setting).
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recovery is to dismember the personal. Love is commodified
into a commercial exchange of services for money. If we think
in terms of a gift/bargain dichotomy, the analysis seems
appropriate, even inevitable. The services either are freely
bestowed, with no monetary expectations, or are part of a
reciprocal exchange.
But if the court casts aside the dichotomy, it could compen-
sate the caretaker by frankly acknowledging that she acted
altruistically, depended upon the recipient for her economic
security, and suffered a loss.94 Theoretically, altruism could
be worthy of a reward. Rewarding altruism, however, requires
an understanding of the selfless and sympathetic nature of the
caretaker's motivation and her vulnerability, along with an
appreciation of the recipient's affective needs. In other words,
recognizing her loss and the connection between the parties is
an admission of the reality of the relationship. Such an
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Section 90(1) grants
compensation if a promise induces a party to suffer a loss, as long as the promisor
could reasonably expect the party to rely on the promise. The caretaker's reliance,
however, would not be considered reasonably foreseeable to the recipient in these
circumstances. A reasonable person would not rely on assurances of security if
unmarried. Besides, the assurances of the recipient do not literally induce the
services if the caretaker acts out of love and not to secure her economic future.
Promissory estoppel usually requires a close nexus between the promise and the
resulting acts of reliance. See, e.g., Hayes v. Plantations Steel Co. 438 A.2d 1091,
1094-95 (R.I. 1982) (stating that the promise of a pension did not cause the employee
to retire as the employee had already decided to leave before the promise was made).
A caretaker would also face great difficulty in proving an explicit promise. Often, the
caretaker relies on the recipient because of his behavior over the years more than any
clear promise or definite form of words. But see Feinman, supra note 53, at 692-93
(pointing out that a promise need not always be expressly stated and is frequently
implied in construction bidding cases). The traditional measure of recovery for
detrimental reliance is no different, however, than what the caretaker is now entitled
to claim, which is the reasonable value of the services. Her expectation that the
recipient would provide for her future and that the relationship would last would not
necessarily be honored. But see id. at 687-88 (arguing that courts frequently honor
the expectation interest in business cases in which there is a claim of detrimental
reliance). Also, a court might not recognize lost opportunities, such as the income she
could have earned or the skills that she might have acquired. See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 13, § 12.1, at 843 (stating that reliance losses do not traditionally include
lost profits or lost opportunities). Courts have at times recognized foregone
opportunities under § 90, however. See, e.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306
N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981) (holding that a man who had quit his job and declined
another offer of compensation based upon a company's offer of employment was
entitled to damages when the company rescinded its offer). Some courts refuse
recovery. See, e.g., Clark Oil & Ref. Corp. v. Leistikow, 230 N.W.2d 736, 744 (Wis.
1975) (holding that defendants who had quit their jobs after signing an agreement
with the plaintiff could not raise the doctrine of promissory estoppel after the
plaintiff terminated the agreement); FARNSWORTH, supra note 13, § 3.25, at 202 n.19
(collecting cases).
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acknowledgement legitimizes the nontraditional family.
Courts prefer to adhere to equivocations over gift/bargain
distinctions, resorting to a convoluted and patently unbeliev-
able analysis of the caretaker's motivation and the nature of
the relationship. The law's perception of the parties as
emotionally self-sufficient and detached individualists is in
turn shaped by a complex array of psychological and socio-
logical factors, as well as cultural values, that enter into the
decision-making process.
II. THE LAW'S CONCERN WITH AUTONOMY AND
DISBELIEF IN ALTRUISM
Courts insist that the parties in all these cases are contract-
ing partners in a bargain exchange because admitting to the
relationship's personal aspects implicitly recognizes the
nonconventional family. The reasons for upholding bright-line
rules defining the family reflect more than just a concern with
conventional morality or a belief that the legislature is the
appropriate forum to legitimize social relationships. There is
a subtle interplay between the law, cultural values, and
relationships between individuals in society. The ways in
which we think are influenced and defined by the ways in
which we live. At the same time, the ways in which we live
are affected and created by laws that are a result of cultural
attitudes. In giving expression to a specific culture's ideology,
law both comments on it and is determined by it. In the
caretaker cases, the relationship of the parties is shaped by a
legal doctrine that is affected by a socially created ideology.
The growth of industrialized society, continuing the gender-
ized division of labor, has led to the development of a world
divided by the social functions performed. The polarization of
the social world into the family and the market, in turn, has
bred dual and conflicting value systems.95 Each is believed
to be inherent to its respective sphere. The highest ethic in
the family is the altruistic collective, whereas in the market,
95. See Olsen, supra note 8, at 1499-1501 (discussing the separation of the
family-the woman's workplace-from the male marketplace and the growth of two
distinct moralities); see also Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A
Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118,
1118-19 (1986); Williams, supra note 5, at 823-25.
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individualism governs behavior and comprises enlightened
self-interest. Justice in the market sphere consists of the
liberty to pursue one's own substantive needs and one's own
conception of the good life, limited by procedural principles of
reciprocity and cooperation.9" The ideal of law is neutrality.
Law's purpose is to prevent harm by ensuring that all mem-
bers of the community are represented in the process, not to
force substantive choices such as the bestowal of benefits or
sacrifice for the sake of others.97 In the public world, we are
free not to care for each other 8 unless we choose the obliga-
tion by entering into a contract.
A. Caretakers and Altruism
In all of the caretaker cases, the parties are in legal limbo.
They are neither commercial strangers, nor formally married,
nor genetically related. Instead of opening up the definition
of a family and allowing it to expand into the public sphere,
the law requires proof of contract to prevent encroachment on
the autonomy of the recipient. In a polarized world, compel-
ling the recipient to pay without a voluntary assumption of a
96. For instance, John Rawls hypothetically places individuals behind a "veil of
ignorance" in order to reach a consensus on principles of justice uncontaminated by
self-interest resulting from ability, strength, or socioeconomic position. JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12, 136-42 (1971). Rawls ignores gender and a social self,
forged by one's life experiences; yet values are socially constructed and cannot be
derived from a decontextualized, intrinsic self.
Ronald Dworkin stresses "political integrity" as an important virtue of political
structure. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 164-65 (1986). According to Dworkin,
political integrity "requires government to speak with one voice, to act in a principled
and coherent manner toward all its citizens, to extend to everyone the substantive
standards of justice or fairness it uses for some." Id. at 165. Dworkin sees the value
of integrity as confirmed "when people in good faith try to treat one another in a way
appropriate to common membership in a community .. . and to see each other as
making this attempt, even when they disagree about exactly what integrity requires
in particular circumstances." Id. at 190. The ideal of integrity, however, does not
sufficiently allow for the recognition of gender-structured social institutions, and is
too vague to yield concrete results in individual cases.
97. One classic expression of a process-oriented theory is JOHN H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-104 (1980) (discussing a process-oriented approach to
constitutional problems, such as that exemplified by the Warren Court, and
contrasting it with the more traditional, value-oriented approach).
98. Charles Fried argues, "[R]elations within a family must be governed by an
altruistic spirit .... Where the sharing is mandated by a higher authority it becomes
despotism." FRIED, supra note 46, at 90.
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contractual obligation looks like an illegitimate interference
with personal freedom. If the definition of a family depends
on a factually sensitive analysis, however, it becomes more
nebulous, and anyone could be held responsible for another's
well-being. The advantage of maintaining bright-line rules
defining the family and a divided social world is that we
produce a clear line delineating individual responsibility.
Legitimizing nonmarital intimate relationships and compen-
sating caretakers blur the two social worlds and impose what
amounts to a generalized duty of care in the public sphere. A
court would hesitate to take this approach, fearing that it
would be accused of institutionalizing values, substituting its
own instead of furthering those of the parties.
Yet law itself fashioned the public/private dichotomy. The
background of court-created existing rules and values inevita-
bly affects and regulates the most intimate areas of our lives.
Law is a power structure that shapes and legitimizes social
relationships through the granting or withholding of recogni-
tion. Legal recognition of the unconventional family is not a
new form of coercion; it acknowledges the reality that human
beings at times form nontraditional family-like relationships,
and treats them like families.99 As it stands, the courts have
made a value choice to ignore many women's values, prioritize
a social division, and discount the possibility of altruism as
well as the importance of relational needs.
The private/public dichotomy also incorrectly presumes an
ideal private world of family in which each person's emotional
needs are gratified. Typecast in this manner in the private
sphere, the public person takes on the attributes of the
individualist, entering into a relationship with a stranger only
to satisfy material interests. By segregating the desires and
99. The artificial distinction of family/contract is highlighted in the doctrine of
the putative spouse. Justice Tobriner in Marvin pointed out that a putative spouse
in some cases need not prove a monetary expectation in order to recover the
reasonable value of the services, contrasting the difference in legal treatment
between putative and non-marital relationships. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106,
118 n. 14 (Cal. 1976). If the caretaker is not aware of the relationship's true status,
the law assumes and allows for altruism. If there is guilty knowledge, however, the
very same conduct must be characterized as commercial in order for compensation
to be justified. See, e.g., Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981) (stating that a woman who had known that she was not legally married and
had performed only domestic services was not entitled to an equitable division of
property).
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interests of the public person from the private, however, courts
implicitly condone exploitation and abuse in the traditional
family. Courts also disregard the fact that the family is not
necessarily successful at meeting each member's psychological
needs. Frequently a caretaker becomes a surrogate family for
a lonely recipient because the real family lives at a distance or
neglects its responsibilities.'0 0 Many people outlive their
relatives and find that they are alone in the last years of their
lives. Naturally they seek affection and companionship, often
in nontraditional ways. For example, nonmarital cohabitation
is not uncommon among the retired.' Same-sex couples
are prevented from marrying because marriage is defined as
a status exclusively between two opposite-sex persons.
10 2
100. For example, in In re Estate of Tulley, Theresa Tulley had depended on Jean
Moore for shopping, for help in cleaning her apartment, and for ordinary friendship.
273 N.W.2d 329, 331 (Wis. 1979). Before she died, Tulley "told her landlord more
than once that she did not know what she would do without the claimant's help." Id.
at 331. In another case, In re Estate of Steffes, Mary Lou Brooks, not the farmer's son
and grandchildren, cared for Virgil Steffes throughout his long and difficult illness.
290 N.W.2d 697 (Wis. 1980); see supra text accompanying notes 67-73. Nevertheless,
she was not legally entitled to a share in the assets of the estate. Id. at 699.
101. See Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of
Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663, 686 (1976); see also Grace G. Blumberg, Cohabitation
Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1149 (1981)
(discussing the economic incentive for cohabitation among aged widows prior to the
changes in the social security laws). However, other potential barriers to marriage
still remain. A widow who wishes to preserve her entire estate for her children might
not remarry if she lives in a jurisdiction that permits a surviving spouse to elect a
statutory share in the estate. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.201 (1991). For a discussion
of the many reasons for informal marriage, see Glendon, supra.
102. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589-90 (Ky. 1973); Baker v.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
Deborah Rhode estimates that lesbians are two to five percent of the adult female
population and that homosexuals constitute five to 13 percent of all male adults.
RHODE, supra note 8, at 141. Although no jurisdiction currently permits same-sex
couples to marry, some cities have passed domestic partnership ordinances which
give some formal recognition to these relationships. Note, Looking for a Family
Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of
Family, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1640, 1658 (1991). In the past, government population
surveys have not gathered statistics on the number of gays and lesbians living
together in long-term relationships; thus, it is difficult to obtain an exact count. Id.
at 1640 n.4. Nonetheless, many sources suggest that the number is rising. Id. The
number of unrelated, opposite-sex couples is also on the increase. Id.
Some individuals prefer not to marry because of the stereotypical gender roles
associated with traditional marriages. Id. at 1658 n.96; David Meade, Consortium
Rights of the Unmarried: Time for a Reappraisal, 15 FAM. L.Q. 223, 233 (1981).
Some see marriage as a social institution to be a perpetuation of patriarchy. See
RHODE, supra note 8, at 133-34; see also Cain, supra note 5, at 212 (stating that, in
their private lives, lesbians are free from male domination).
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Some women fear loss of alimony or temporary support if they
should remarry.' 3  Informal marriage has become more
socially acceptable and commonplace among college students
and those in the workforce."° There are multiple variations
of the family for many reasons in the messy, fuzzy, non-
Westlaw world. But few of these alternatives are defined and
made real in law.
The law's refusal to expand the meaning of family and to
break down the boundaries of the divided social world sustains
the notion that the individual is at the core self-serving and
incapable of promoting another's welfare or of acting to relieve
another person's pain. We fail to see the many examples of
lifestyles which suggest that solitude is not the normal state of
human existence. Human nature is poorly defined by the
paradigm of the individualist armed with rights. As human
beings, we prefer interrelationship. Providing care is one way
in which we form relationships and is a natural response to
fundamental human needs.
If a court is willing to collapse the rigid boundary between
family and contract relationships, it would impliedly admit to the
presence of altruism outside of husband/wife and parent/child
relationships. However, the law has a problem with altruism as
well as a concern with autonomy. Altruistic motives are not
considered a credible explanation for human behavior,"°5 except
103. In some jurisdictions, cohabitation also results in the loss of alimony. See,
e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 43 § 134(D) (Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(6) (1989);
see also Glendon, supra note 101, at 690 n.116 (collecting cases).
104. See Glendon, supra note 101, at 686. Glendon states that:
Cohabitation has become a significant fact of life in sectors of society where
before, if it existed at all, it was carefully concealed.... [M]ost informal
marriages in the.., past.., have been confined to intellectual elites and to...
the poor, racial and ethnic minorities for whom the structures of traditional
marriage and divorce law sometimes have been irrelevant ....
Today, however, informal marriage is increasingly common among other
social groups and, perhaps more significant, increasingly accepted.
Id. at 685-86.
Approximately two million or more couples live together in de facto marriages. See
deFuria, supra note 69, at 208-09 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 412, HOUSEHOLDS,
FAMILIES, MARITAL STATUS, AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1986 Advance
Report 2, fig. 2); Kandoian, supra note 66, at 1831 n.12.
105. Altruism has been defined as "self-destructive behavior performed for the
benefit of others." Edward 0. Wilson, The Genetic Evolution of Altruism, in
ALTRUISM, SYMPATHY, AND HELPING, supra note 6, at 11, 11.
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for the instinctive responses that are programmed in one's
genes to protect the immediate family. °" The family has
come to stand for altruism and the market for self-interest
because the dual value system reflects what many people
believe to be an accurate description of reality. The caretaker
must prove that she expected to be paid for her labor and that
the parties entered into a contract, not a relationship, so that
her motivation comports with society's perception of human
nature. 
0 7
B. Altruism and Modern Society
Altruistic tendencies require a social setting that fosters
sympathy for others. In modern society, community feelings
are likely to be inhibited by growth management policies that
concentrate on housing developments in the suburbs. Subur-
ban growth actually could heighten social divisions by destroy-
ing the mix of socioeconomic classes in urban neighborhoods
and replacing them with developments composed of narrow,
social-demographic groupings. Communities no longer are
developed to build a sense of neighborhood, but to provide easy
access to an expressway, facilitating travel from home to the
workplace.
106. Sociobiology explains altruism as a mechanism of species survival:
An organism that consumed all the food it gathered, instead of feeding some
of it to children, might well live a long time, but it would not pass on its selfish
tendencies to future generations .... Over evolutionary time, what survives is
not the organism but the tendency. to feed children rather than the tendency
to feed only oneself.
Mark Ridley & Richard Dawkins, The Natural Selection ofAltruism, in ALTRUISM AND
HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL, PERSONALITY, AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES 19,
22 (J. Phillipe Rushton & Richard M. Sorrentino eds., 1981) [hereinafter ALTRUISM
AND HELPING BEHAVIOR]. J. Phillipe Rushton explains sociobiological theories on
altruism in the following manner:
Critics might question how behaviors such as running into burning
automobiles to rescue strangers from otherwise certain death are explained by
such a theory. The answer lies in human history. One and a half million years
ago, when human altruism evolved, such dramatic behaviors did in fact
propagate the actor's own genes because people lived within a tribe of
individuals who all were more or less directly related to one another.
Rushton, supra note 6, at 429.
107. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
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Work patterns also keep adults from the home. Today, the
workplace has become our surrogate neighborhood. There,
however, individuals are organized into a myriad of imper-
sonal bureaucracies, making decisions that affect people's
lives with very little personal interaction or exchange of
information.' Relationships have become formalized.
Individuals are inclined to see themselves within various
social roles, reacting to the social roles of others. Role-
playing, however, can lead to stereotyping, breeding prejudice
as well as furthering the distance between individuals.
Bureaucratization suppresses an individual's emotional
capacity to understand another as a whole person and to
respond naturally. Other policies, such as those favoring
private transportation over public, also limit social connec-
tions, leading to hierarchical interactions with others.
The ways in which we think, influenced by and developed
through social relationships, also contribute to the ambiva-
lence surrounding altruism. Post-enlightenment theories, and
especially the social compact metaphor, represent the individ-
ual's sense of living in a socially isolated environment by
expressing an ideology of cultural relativity.0 9 Substantive
values are individualized, stressing free choice. The liberal
ethic of free choice necessarily implies a theory of human
relationships in which unrelated human beings harbor
different and conflicting needs. One's own ends are usually
devoid of communal ties. Collective goals are viewed as a
108. See UNGER, supra note 3, at 170-74 (detailing with great sensitivity a
person's experience of alienation). Unger asks the following question: "[Slocial
relationships themselves establish who one is. But one is different in each of the
seemingly unrelated roles one occupies. Which is the real person among these
several persons, or, if all of them are masks, where is the true face to be found?" Id.
at 173; see also Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and
Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 8-10 (discussing liberalism's failure to
recognize the inherently social nature of human beings); Peller, supra note 3, at
1278-89 (analyzing social relationships which appear normal but are marked by one
party being privileged over the other: parent and child, man and woman, teacher and
student, and manager and worker).
109. See Mary Midgley, On Not Being Afraid of Natural Sex Differences, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN PHILOSOPHY 29, 32 (Morwenna Griffiths & Margaret
Whitford eds., 1988) (commenting on the solitary nature of the social contract and its
implicit exclusion of women); see also Benhabib, supra note 4, at 89 (arguing that
identity refers to how one actually uses one's birth, family, linguistic, cultural, and
gender identities to make choices). Women who internalize liberalism's commitment
to autonomy become subject to its dangers, just like men. They can slide into
nihilism. A recent example is the fate of the two heroines in the film, Thelma and
Louise (M.G.M.-Pathe Communications Co. 1991).
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composite of personal aims and are best served by recognizing
the unalterably selfish nature of human behavior. A frag-
mented society has evolved a fragmented phenomenology,
assuming an inside atomistic self apart from others in the
outside object world. The self is described as fundamentally
unitary, existing in a state of isolation bereft of social ties.
Connection is assumed to be rational only if it is self-
interested, an expression of autonomy. The person is differ-
entiated from others by a wide range of characteristics,
including each subject's aspirations, needs, fears, and
interests. But what individuates also separates. Interests
at times might coincidently be the same but the personal
subjective selves do not interrelate. In liberalism, the
human being is self-enclosed. Michael Sandel, in criticizing
contemporary liberalism as exemplified by the Rawlsian
social compact, states that the self is put "beyond the reach
of experience,""' and identity is conceived as independent
and prior to interrelationships."' The self is disabled
from subjectively understanding the other."
2
110. MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMiTs OF JUSTICE 62 (1982).
111. Id. at 134.
112. But as Sandel states:
[A] self so thoroughly independent as this rules out any conception of the good
(or of the bad) bound up with possession in the constitutive sense .... It rules
out the possibility of a public life in which, for good or ill, the identity as well
as the interests of the participants could be at stake. And it rules out the possi-
bility that common purposes and ends could inspire more or less expansive self-
understandings and so define a community in the constitutive sense, a
community describing the subject and not just the objects of shared aspirations.
More generally, Rawls' account rules out the possibility of what we might call
'intersubjective' or 'intrasubjective' forms of self-understanding, ways of
conceiving the subject that do not assume its bounds to be given in advance.
Id. at 62. The self cannot altruistically gratify another's needs if unable to know in
concrete terms what the other desires.
[Gliven the separateness of persons and the intractability of the bounds
between them, the content of this good (that is, the good I wish another) must
be largely opaque to me. On Rawls' view, love is blind, not for its intensity but
rather for the opacity of the good that is the object of its concern.
Id. at 170-71.
However, Clare Dalton, as a feminist, disputes the opacity of boundaries between
the self and other:
My story reveals the world of contract doctrine to be one in which a compara-
tive few mediating devices are constantly deployed to displace and defer the
otherwise inevitable revelation that public cannot be separated from private,
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Precluded from directly knowing the other's point of view or
subjective motivations, there is a tendency to conclude
cynically that altruistic intentions do not really exist. 113  In
or form from substance, or objective manifestation from subjective intent. The
pain of that revelation, and its value, lies in its message that we can neither
know nor control the boundary between self and other.
Dalton, supra note 47, at 1113.
Robin West puts it another way:
Both the promise and the problem of law, including the law of contracts, arise
from ambivalent feelings of both knowledge and ignorance of the other and fear
and love for the other ....
... The reification of rights that the Rule of Law facilitates-championed by
the liberal as the law's greatest triumph-at times increases rather than
bridges the distance between us. It is not the Rule of Law, but empathy, that
can unite the self with stranger ....
Robin West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's
Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 817, 862-63 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
113. Ronald Cohen writes:
Since I can never fully get into the mind of another, I can always assume that
my giving produces some feelings of satisfaction and well-being, but I can never
confidently argue that the desire to give of my efforts, time, or resources is not
in terms of real or imagined rewards rather than in terms of some innate
helping or altruistic impulse. This means that, in effect, the hedonistic paradox
makes a good logical basis for postulating man's essentially hedonistic nature,
although it obviously neither proves nor disproves such a postulate or its oppo-
site-namely, that man can act from purely altruistic motives.
Ronald Cohen, Altruism: Human, Cultural, or What?, in ALTRUISM, SYMPATHY, AND
HELPING, supra note 6, at 79, 83; see also Martin L. Hoffman, The Development of
Empathy, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR, supra note 106, at 41, 41 (comment-
ing that the inference of a hidden selfish motive fits culturally within Western
philosophy's concept of human nature).
Some studies have proven the existence of altruism. See, e.g., Shalom H.
Schwartz, Elicitation of Moral Obligation and Self-Sacrificing Behavior: An
Experimental Study of Volunteering to Be a Bone Marrow Donor, 15 J. OF PERSON-
ALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 283, 289 (1970) (stating that 83% in a population of 144
agreed to blood tests to be used to determine compatibility for bone marrow trans-
plants). Nonetheless, we tend to emphasize and popularize notorious examples of
nonaltruistic conduct as proof of its nonexistence. The well-known case of Kitty
Genovese, killed by her assailant while 38 neighbors observed the incident and failed
to intercede, is one example. Martin Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn't Call the
Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1964, at Al; see also Silver, supra note 10, at 423
(discussing notorious examples).
Dr. Schwartz has suggested that the capacity for altruistic behavior is related to
an awareness that conduct will have positive consequences for others, cognizance of
an ability to control actions, and a sense of personal responsibility for one's behavior.
See Schwartz, supra, at 283. As the degree of personal involvement and salience of
consequences weakens, so does the tendency to intervene.
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autonomous isolation, the person is likely to assume, without
really being sure, that there is an element of psychic gain in
every seemingly altruistic act. Paradoxically, altruism is
believed to be, at bottom, selfish behavior, because there is
self-satisfaction in self-sacrifice. Finding a bargain exchange
in the caretaker cases is intuitively apt if all seemingly
donative conduct is motivated by self-profit." 4  Those who
claim to act for unselfish reasons are viewed with hostility and
suspicion because they must be hypocrites unwilling to admit
to their secret psychological gains." 5
Nonetheless, the inability to know another's mind does not
require that we choose between the two extremes in belief: a
world in which altruism never exists and one in which all acts
of charity and benevolence are disinterested. Rather, we can
work together, building a world in which barriers between the
self and other are removed and creating a climate in which
114. A classic example of the altruistic paradox is found in Allegheny College v.
National Chautauqua County Bank, in which Judge Cardozo characterizes a philan-
thropist's motivation in promising a gift to a college as the self-seeking desire to be
remembered after death. 159 N.E. 173, 175 (N.Y. 1927). If psychic gain is present,
the difference between donative promises and bargains breaks down. Landes and
Posner also refer to the importance of public recognition in charitable donations,
stating that anonymous gifts are relatively rare. Landes & Posner, supra note 17,
at 93. Donors frequently "negotiate, sometimes fiercely, with universities, hospitals,
and other charitable institutions over the price of naming the donor on a building or
a room." Id. at 94.
However, some studies researching various tribal cultures suggest more
complicated motivations for donative conduct. Gifting and acts of sacrifice are ways
to create a social life and maintain a particular culture's social bonds. See, e.g.,
Sasha R. Weitman, Prosocial Behavior and Its Discontents, in ALTRUISM, SYMPATHY,
AND HELPING, supra note 6, at 229, 232 (discussing the theories of Ldvi-Strauss and
Mauss). See generally CLAUDE LvI-STRAuss, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF
KINSHIP (1969); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN
ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (1967).
115. Certainly there are logical reasons to distrust opportunists who preach
altruism and appeal to our better nature in the name of brotherhood or sisterhood
merely to gain a purely personal political or economic advantage, a form of officious-
ness. History has taught us that such advocates are dangerous to the common good.
See FRIED, supra note 46, at 90-91 (arguing that forced altruism becomes tyranny).
But the opposite is equally threatening. Persuading others to consider only their self-
interest can be a form of victimization, a divide-and-conquer strategy. For example,
in the film, On the Waterfront (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1954), the longshoremen
were unable to rid themselves of the tyranny of corrupt union officials as long as each
was concerned with individual job security. Once self-interest was cast aside and the
workers joined together, they were able to overthrow the officials. The workers
internalized the group's collective interests, a form of altruism discussed by Harrison.
See Harrison, supra note 6, at 1343. Appeals to act for the good of others or
exhortations on behalf of individualism and autonomy are equally capable of being
used as a means of exploitation.
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altruism can flourish. One way to accomplish this goal is to
unmask the persons and the relationship hidden behind a
contract in the caretaker cases. By recognizing their connec-
tion we can begin to understand that we have created the
social divisions we desire to transcend.
The cultural disbelief in altruism also finds support in
classical psychoanalysis, in which altruistic conduct is
treated as psychoneurotic behavior. For example, in analyz-
ing one of her patients who was a governess-in other words,
a caretaker-Anna Freud stated the following:
Although she took no trouble about her own dress, she
displayed a lively interest in her friends' clothes. Child-
less herself, she was devoted to other people's children
.... Instead of exerting herself to achieve any aims of her
own, she expended all her energy in sympathizing with
the experiences of people she cared for.'16
Freud explains this behavior as egotistical despite the outward
appearance of altruism:
The vanity of her women friends provided, as it were, a
foothold for the projection of her own vanity, while her
libidinal wishes and ambitious fantasies were likewise
deposited in the outside world .... The surrender of her
instinctual impulses in favor of other people had thus an
egoistic significance, but in her efforts to gratify the
impulses of others her behavior could only be called
altruistic."7
Freud diagnoses altruism as the secondhand enjoyment of
forbidden fruits, vicariously identifying one's prohibited
instinctual impulses with another. People project their desires
onto the nonself, not out of an understanding of the other's
needs, but as a neurotic form of self-gratification. Giving
becomes an illness, symptomatic of abnormality."' The
116. ANNA FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE 125 (Cecil Baines
trans., International Universities Press 1966) (1936).
117. Id. at 125-26.
118. Although a large number of volunteers are willing to donate a kidney to
unrelated needy recipients, the medical profession routinely rejects strangers as
prospective donors, assuming that the motivation is indicative of mental disturbance.
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possibility of a healthy projection of one's felt needs and an
empathetic identification is minimized." 9 Altruists are at
best neurotics and at worst hypocritical and manipulative.
The self cannot even trust itself to acknowledge its own
desires because the conscious mind deceptively masks egocen-
tric needs. Sigmund Freud stated:
Assuming that unconscious tendencies do exist in mental
life, the fact that the opposite tendencies predominate in
conscious life goes to prove nothing. Perhaps there is room
in the mind for opposite tendencies, for contradictions,
existing side by side; indeed, possibly the very predom-
inance of the one tendency conditions the unconscious
nature of the opposite.
120
The more altruistic we seem, the more egoistic we are.
Through symbolic dreams and fantasies, unconscious and
preconscious desires find expression, and the self is revealed
to be relentlessly driven by the libido to seek selfish pleasures,
unconstrained by the dictates of society.
Perhaps, then, you will undertake to overlook the
offensive nature of the censored dream-wishes and will
fall back upon the argument that it is surely very improb-
able that we ought to concede so large a part in the
human constitution to what is evil. But do your own
experiences justify you in this statement? I will say
nothing of how you may appear in your own eyes, but
have you met with so much goodwill in your superiors and
rivals, so much chivalry in your enemies and so little envy
amongst your acquaintances, that you feel it incumbent on
you to protest against the idea of the part played by
egoistic baseness in human nature? Do you not know how
Carl H. Fellner & Shalom H. Schwartz, Altruism in Disrepute, 284 NEW ENG. J. MED.
582, 582 (1971); see also supra note 31 (discussing the view of donative promises as
irrational behavior).
119. Anna Freud writes: "It remains an open question whether there is such a
thing as a genuinely altruistic relation to one's fellowmen, in which the gratification
of one's own instinct plays no part at all, even in some displaced and sublimated
form." FREUD, supra note 116, at 134 n.4.
120. SIGMUND FREUD, The Dream-Censorship, in A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 122, 129-30 (Joan Riviere trans., Liveright Publishing Corp. 1935)
(1920). For a discussion of Sigmund Freud's legal theory and its relationship to
liberalism, see generally West, supra note 112, passim.
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uncontrolled and unreliable the average human being is
in all that concerns sexual life? Or are you ignorant of the
fact that all the excesses and aberrations of which we
dream at night are crimes actually committed every day
by men who are wide awake? What does psycho-analysis
do in this connection but confirm the old saying of Plato
that the good are those who content themselves with
dreaming of what others, the wicked, actually do? 1 '
Insofar as the self cannot know itself except through the
distorted representation of symbols, self-consciousness
constitutes an awareness of self-alienation as well as alien-
ation from others.
In summary, the law prioritizes autonomy and refuses to
redefine the family because, as a society, we are unable to
articulate a coherent principle of altruistic collective responsi-
bility that rises above self-interest. In a world in which the
person is socially distanced from others, the liberalist ethic
cannot envision a self subjectively able to understand the
other, and the post-Freudian perspective views personality as
not experientially needing connection except to further its own
ends. Alienated in many ways, we have come to believe in the
social divisions that the law tells us cannot be changed.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF GENDERIZED CHILD CARE
Social roles within the family, as well as social life in the
outside world, influence the characteristics of an individual's
personality, the specific values of a culture, and the law.
Studies in psychology have long recognized that the sense of
self and an individual's frame of reference to others are
profoundly influenced by early childhood experiences.'22 The
self is a complex concept, involving the physical and emotional
sensations of a biochemical creature and the cognitive aware-
ness of a bounded ego separate and apart from all other
objects in the world. Genderized child care-the caretaking of
121. FREUD, supra note 120, at 130.
122. In emphasizing the mother/child relationship in my analysis, I do not deny
multiple cultural identities or the importance of the various social organizations in
which each of us are situated. Nonetheless, primary relationships in the family also
are constitutive to identity formation.
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virtually all children by females-has the potential to explain
why many men and women lead dissimilar lives and develop
different modes of moral reasoning. Because women are
almost exclusively responsible for child care, 23 Nancy
Chodorow claims that consciousness of self is the result of a
response of the infant to the gender of the caretaker and the
caretaker's interaction with the gender of the child.
124
In Chodorow's view, the primary caretaker perceives a
daughter as an extension of self, whereas a son is understood
to be an other because he is the sexual opposite.'25 The
male is both externally encouraged by the caretaker to see
himself as different from the mother and internally compelled
to abandon his connection to her because of oedipal fears of
paternal anger and punishment. In addition, the newly
emerging masculine identification is threatened by mother
dependency. The male child's attachment to the primary
caretaker terminates too quickly and the severance is sharp
and incisive. The creation of the self is traumatic because ego
boundaries are a necessary defense against incestuous
sexuality. 26  On the other hand, the female child has no
need to relinquish the sense of oneness and continuity with
the same gender caretaker. She remains attached to the
primary caretaker for a longer period of time and moves into
the oedipal phase at a more leisurely pace. She is able to
internalize the caretaker connection into a sense of self,
123. Even if the biological mother is unable to perform the role of primary
caretaker, women traditionally raise children in the home or in day-care settings.
CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING, supra note 7, at 216.
124. Id. at 77-110. Chodorow has revised her original thesis to some extent and
no longer claims gender identity is solely determined by mothering. See CHODOROW,
FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY, supra note 7, at 6. Not all feminists agree
with Chodorow. See, e.g., JESSICA BENJAMIN, THE BONDS OF LOVE: PSYCHOANALYSIS,
FEMINISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF DOMINATION 90-92 (1988) (arguing that reclaiming
the importance of the mother as nurturer in identity formation has led to idealizing
a woman's desexualization, lack of agency, and passivity, as well as preserving a
separate, unchallenged male domain of freedom and sexual desire); JANE FLAX,
THINKING FRAGMENTS: PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM AND POSTMODERNISM IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WEST 165-67 (1990) (arguing that Chodorow's analysis fails
sufficiently to take into account racial and class-based differences or to explain why
women have been given responsibility for child rearing). The various feminist
psychoanalytic theories are reviewed by Grosskurth, The New Psychology of Women,
XXXVIII THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 25 (1991).
125. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING, supra note 7, at 100, 105.
I use the terms "son," "daughter," and 'mother" broadly, not limiting them to
biological mother-and-child relationships.
126. Id. at 134-35, 166-67.
WINTER 1992] 469
470 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 25:2
gradually developing a self that is more joined to others and
the world. 27  The female does not resolve the oedipus
complex. The mother lives inside the daughter.'28
Accordingly, Chodorow's theory posits a difference in male
and female ego sense. The male, who is forced to resolve
oedipal desires, defines himself by his separation from the
primary caretaker, whereas the female forms a self in connec-
tion to her. The male self is a defensive solid with well-
marked ego boundaries. The female self is liquid. As a fluid,
it takes on various shapes and is imbued with the colors of
relationships, continuously flowing and overlapping into
others. Empathy permeates the ego and relationships are a
natural part of the self. Men, however, experience ambivalent
feelings of fear and desire over attachment. Because the male
must cope with premature separation from the primary
caretaker, he both yearns for caring and denies his longing,
repressing the infantile associations that his emotional needs
entail.
1 29
Women's mothering affects adult relationships as well. Both
sexes reenact their original relationship with the primary
caretaker in adult personal relationships, reproducing the
roles of mother and child. 3 ° Women, including those with
paying jobs, are more likely to be the nurturers and the
comforters, raising children and working in the home. Men
are more inclined to be the recipients of caring and to be the
providers and protectors, placing career goals in the forefront.
Furthermore, as a result of the caretaker connection, some
women do not experience the alienation and disconnection
from others that is inherent in living in the fragmented public
social world. The lives of a significant number of women often
are either partially or fully devoted to care (of children, of
spouse, and/or of elderly parents).13' They are involved in
127. Id. at 110, 135-40. Separation from the primary caretaker can take on
neurotic characteristics in women as well as in men. Women tend to have difficulty
in achieving individuation and independence. They can remain neurotically attached
to the primary caretaker as adults. Id. at 135, 140.
128. Id. at 168.
129. Id. at 169.
130. Id. at 194-95; see also DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE
MINOTAUR 61 (1976) (discussing the attempt to recover the loss of the mother in adult
relationships).
131. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING, supra note 7, at 214-15.
Susan Okin reports that two-fifths of married women are full-time housewives. See
OKIN, supra note 8, at 150; see also PHILLIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTz, AMERI-
CAN COUPLES 312 (1983) (stating that culturally, "growing up female makes
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an affective network of family and friends. Although a part of
the workplace, because they must balance its needs with other
obligations, they often set their own career goals with others
in mind.13 2  Many women bring a caring ethic to the work-
place. Responsibility and commitment to various relationships
structure their value system.'33 In addition, some women
learn to associate men with financial security and come to
expect they will be dependent on a relationship to survive.'34
housework something women do"). Half of all mothers with young children work and
85% of working women can expect to bear at least one child while in the workforce.
Finley, supra note 95, at 1125. Cynthia Epstein estimates that close to 70% of
women between ages 25 and 54 were in the labor force by 1984, including 20 million
mothers. CYNTHIA EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS: SEX, GENDER, AND THE
SOCIAL ORDER 202 (1988). Despite changes in the workforce, the traditional division
of labor in the home has not altered. Id. at 213. Moreover, as our aging population
increases, women have assumed the burden of caring for elderly relatives. Id. at 212.
Ninety-five percent bf the elderly live near or with their children; only five percent
are placed in institutions. Id. Much of the work women do in the home has not been
documented precisely because it is not perceived as labor. Scholars have only
recently focused on the nurturant role and the amount of time spent on family
activities. Id. at 200. Thus, women must make contingent career choices in light of
their families' needs.
132. See MARY F. BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING 149-52 (1986).
133. Id. at 149-50.
134. See, e.g., SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX 156 (1970) (claiming
that healthy love is not possible as long as women are economically dependent on
men). One psychological study indicated that women tend to be more pragmatic and
"storgic" (love is friendship) than men in their attitudes toward love and close
personal relationships, taking into account a man's wealth and social position. Men
are inclined to be more erotic and "ludic" (love is a game). Clyde Hendrick et al., Do
Men and Women Love Differently?, 1 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 177, 180-84
(1984); see also Ted L. Huston & Richard D. Ashmore, Women and Men in Personal
Relationships, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF FEMALE-MALE RELATIONS 167, 190-91
(Richard D. Ashmore & Frances K. Del Boca eds., 1986) (discussing the possible
reasons behind gender-based attitudes toward love). These studies do not necessarily
contradict the ethic of care as much as they suggest its origins. Although survival
needs and dependency often dictate women's preferences, within a state of depend-
ency women have attempted to carve out their own ethical stance. One thoughtful
study, based on in-depth interviews with many women that allowed them to speak
in their own words, suggests women think primarily in relational terms, placing
others' needs before their own because of their identification with the mother's role
in the family. As a result, women tend to be less transactionally oriented than men
in relationships. BELENKY ET AL., supra note 132, at 178. In comparing the difference
in reasoning between men and women, the authors state: "[T]he individual who
conceptualizes the self as basically connected to others sees the bonds that knit
human relationships together as bonds of attachment .... In contrast, the self
premised in autonomy sees individuals relating through bonds of agreements, such
as contracts, laws, and the like." Id.
Women's creative writings are wonderful examples of their capacity to create a
moral life in the midst of their gender-bound situation. Fran Olsen refers to the work
of Jane Austen, who attempted to give voice to a woman's morality within the
confines of a society in which women were totally dependent on marriage for their
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Seeing themselves as caretakers, they do not develop an
interest in mutual business concerns, preferring to place a
high priority on relational needs. They often consider think-
ing of one's own goals to be a selfish response. 3 ' They are
unlikely to negotiate a return when emotionally involved
because their motivation flows from the relationship itself, not
from the desires of a separate unitary self.
Conversely, a great many men self-actualize away from the
home through their public social roles. Because individuation
requires rejection of the mother and identity is tied to the
father-outside world, some males tend to devalue the emo-
tional, more contextualized concerns that define women's
lives.
136
Thus, it is possible that liberalism's commitment to the
separation thesis and the law's refusal to recognize altruism
reflect a predominantly male phenomenology. In the caretaker
cases, there could be two moral orientations and perceptions of
the problem to be solved. 13 7 A court's frame of reference is
the more typically male justice model or the priority of
social position and survival. See Olsen, supra note 8, at 1523 n. 106. The values of
Elizabeth Bennett in Pride and Prejudice center on caring and responsibility to
others. Her initial refusal to marry Mr. Darcy is based partly on the fact that he
secretly aided in ending the developing relationship between her sister and his best
friend. JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 170 (Frank W. Bradbrook ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1970) (1813). Her own needs are secondary to the needs of her family.
Louisa May Alcott's Little Women contains a rich subtext. Although women's values
are a morally superior vision to men's, in a patriarchal society women are condemned
to the domestic sphere and are unable to become fully realized human beings. Ann
Murphy writes:
Marmee loves and socializes, nurtures and stifles her daughters, offering them
a vision of perfect love and oneness that heterosexuality cannot hope to dupli-
cate, and an alternate model of identity through community, domesticity, and
altruism that their culture can only tolerate by subsuming it in the archetype
of female goodness that kills Beth.
Ann B. Murphy, The Borders of Ethical, Erotic, and Artistic Possibilities in Little
Women, 15 SIGNS 562, 575 (1990).
135. See BELENKY ET AL., supra note 132, at 77.
136. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING, supra note 7, at 181-82
("The secure possession of certain realms, and the insistence that these realms are
superior to the maternal world of youth, become crucial both to the definition of
masculinity and to a particular boy's own masculine gender identification.").
137. The two different voices of morality are explained in MAKING CONNECTIONS,
supra note 4, at 41-47; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 50-55
(1985) (theorizing that a woman's lawyering would emphasize mediation and
alternate dispute resolution instead of a winner-take-all, adversarial model).
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principle. This model defines the moral problem as a disputed
claim of a contract between two separate individualists with
equal rights. 3 ' Courts emphasize what the parties have in
common, treating the caretaker in the same way that they
would the recipient if he were in her position. Entitlements
are measured according to abstract principles of reciprocity, not
responsiveness to a particular person's specific needs. This
resolution of the moral dilemma is justified by its adherence to
an "objective" code of conduct, or norms of behavior that most
individuals would regard as fair. If the caretaker can prove a
contract, a court will require the recipient to meet his obliga-
tions and perform his duties. The law's result leaves the
parties in positions of equal independence.
However, considering that the context of many of the
caretaker cases is an intimate relationship, the second model
more likely reflects the caretaker's perspective.'39  A care-
taker focuses on the person, not principles, and defines the
moral issue as a problem with the relationship. She does not
see the parties as equals, but as co-dependents who are
emotionally attached. To the caretaker, the right decision is
the compassionate one. If connection between the parties
cannot be restored, she believes that the pain she feels over
the loss of the relationship ought to be mitigated. 40
138. For example, the Steffes court framed the issue as follows: "[Wihere services
are performed . .. with expectation of reasonable compensation, recovery may be
allowed on the basis of a contract to pay, implied in fact or law." In re Estate of
Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 701 (Wis. 1980). Ironically, the presiding justice in this case
was a woman. While I believe that she was more sympathetic to the caretaker's
plight for that reason, she nonetheless expressed herself in terms of the traditional
discourse.
139. Although there is a tendency to speak of the second model as the feminine
voice, and Chodorow's theory suggests women are more prone to view the world in
this way, the cases discussed in this Article demonstrate men as well as women can
be motivated by a caretaking ethic. The argument that a woman's morality differs
at times from a male's is most compelling when the parties have assumed traditional
social roles, living together as de facto husband and wife, with the woman as the
caretaker/dependent party. This situation comprises the bulk of the caretaker cases.
140. In some of the cases, women attempt to justify their claim for compensation
as damages for what they have suffered for relational loss before turning to a Marvin
claim. See, e.g., Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(describing a plaintiff who charged fraud because the "defendant promised to marry
her but refused to do so"); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Wis. 1987)
(describing the plaintiffs allegations that the defendant indicated both orally and
through his conduct that he considered her to be his wife and that she would share
equally in his increased wealth).
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Compelled to abide by the justice model, the caretaker is
unable to explain why she really feels she has been harmed,
that she believes the parties are mutually responsible for each
other's welfare. What the caretaker values the most, the
caring bestowed on the other person, is not a part of the
evaluation of her conduct. The law identifies her as perform-
ing a contractual obligation and denies her moral identity as
a caring self, submerged in a relationship.
Genderized child care offers a profound psychological
explanation for why the law adheres so strongly to the
contractual model. The intimate nature of the relationship
between the caretaker and the recipient may represent a
reenactment of the mother/child attachment, causing the
lawmaker' 4 ' to identify with the recipient and to see the
caretaker as a powerful mother-figure. The very intensity of
the initial attachment to the mother and her importance to
survival and emotional growth may leave many men with a
legacy of hostility toward women and a fear of maternal
power. To many men, separation is life-giving in that mascu-
line self-definition comes from rejecting the maternal
bond. 4 2  In these cases, all the resultant apprehension and
141. Lawmakers are seldom women. For example, in Florida, only 10% of state
court judges are women. Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study
Commission, 42 FLA. L. REV. 803, 928 (1990) [hereinafter Bias Study]. Some judicial
positions are elected; women attorneys find it particularly difficult to raise the
necessary funds and to accumulate the obligatory political influence required to
succeed in an election contest. Id. Some Florida judges are appointed by Judicial
Nominating Commissions. These commissions are disproportionately represented by
men. Id. at 929. Recent studies indicate that these commissions discount many
female candidates for judgeships because they practice in the area of family law, which
is not considered as prestigious or as sophisticated as a commercial law practice and
is perceived as a "female" profession. Id. at 930. Ironically, family law issues
constitute 40% of all civil filings in Florida, second only to criminal cases. Id. at 811.
Nationally, women are also underrepresented in law school faculties and in law
firms. Id. at 917; see also Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Note, Gatekeepers
of the Profession: An Empirical Profile of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 191, 199 (1991) (reporting that slightly more than 20% of the nation's law
professors are women). Even when present in these areas, they do not occupy
important, policy-making positions. Few women are tenured, achieve partnership, or
wield the political influence to implement change in bureaucratic decision making.
Bias Study, supra, at 917; Borthwick & Schau, supra, at 199-212.
As of 1990, there were 27 women serving in the United States House of Representa-
tives and exactly two women in the Senate. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1991, at 263,395 (111th ed. 1991). Even if women
are able to achieve positions of authority and thus are able to make policy, I believe
they are likely to be women who have assimilated male perspectives.
142. Chodorow writes:
For children of both genders, mothers represent regression and lack of auton-
omy. A boy associates these issues with his gender identification as well.
474
Redefining the Family
emotional baggage that interdependence represents is brought
to the surface. The legal discourse, seemingly rational and
objective, actually could be the troubled response of the
mature male, who always is engaged to some extent in the
young male's primal struggle to gain independence from the
primary caretaker and to accept his renunciation of mother-
love. If the caring and the connection between the parties are
recognized, the recipient's emotional dependence on the
mother-and her power over the helpless male child-is
acknowledged as well. Seeking to suppress such oedipal
issues from the analysis, the lawmaker reframes the personal
relationship as a bargain between two adult autonomous
males. In this way, the discourse manages to preserve the
male's individuality and self-reliance, but at the expense of
stifling the female's self-expression, caring, and experience of
connectedness.
Dependence on his mother, attachment to her, and identification with her
represent that which is not masculine; a boy must reject dependence and deny
attachment and identification .... A boy represses those qualities he takes to
be feminine inside himself, and rejects and devalues women and whatever he
considers to be feminine in the social world.
CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING, supra note 7, at 181. Isaac Balbus
contends:
The demands of "masculine" in contrast to "feminine" development thus dictate
that the imperatives of individuation, of defining oneself in opposition to the
mother, will be reinforced dramatically by the need of the male child to
suppress the "female" within him. This means that the separation of the male
child from his mother is likely to be both more extreme and more painful than
that which the female child experiences. Consequently his fear and loathing of
the mother will be more intense as well.
ISAAC D. BALBUS, MARXISM AND DOMINATION: A NEO-HEGELIAN, FEMINIST,
PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF SEXUAL, POLITICAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL LIBERATION
308 (1982). Balbus argues the very power of the mother over the infant plants the
seeds of domination and leads to excluding woman from the public sphere:
The woman represents for him the dreaded specter of the power of the mother,
a power from which he has spent the better part of his emotional life trying to
escape; the power of the woman must therefore be constrained-she must be
kept in her place-lest she reestablish the maternal tyranny that the man
experienced as an infant.
Id. at 310; see also DINNERSTEIN, supra note 130, at 164-75 (describing the power of
the child's attachment to its mother and arguing that both sexes continue throughout
their lives to assert themselves against their mother). The mother must at times
frustrate as well as satisfy the infant's desires. She holds "life-and-death control over
helpless infancy." Id. at 164 (emphasis omitted).
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What is discussed least in the cases-sexual relations
between caretaker-mother and recipient-son-could cause the
discourse to become overtly hostile. 143  A judge denies
compensation outright, or suppresses inappropriate, childish
longings associating sexuality with dependency, leaving only
a socially acceptable exchange of commodities.4 4  Recogniz-
ing the caring in any of these cases is akin to exposing a
neurotic dependency on mother. 45 In emotionally identify-
ing with the male recipient, courts also identify with the
male's strong financial interest in not treating the relationship
as a marriage. At best, the parties entered a contract with
limited responsibilities for each other.
143. Some courts, perhaps caught up in gender stereotyping, seem angry at the
women in the cases. They see the women as sexually calculating, taking advantage
of male innocence. For example, in Hewitt v. Hewitt, the court wrote:
[Ilt would seem more candid to acknowledge the return of varying forms of
common law marriage than to continue displaying the naivete we believe
involved in the assertion that there are involved in these relationships contracts
separate and independent from the sexual activity, and the assumption that
those contracts would have been entered into or would continue without that
activity.
394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (Ill. 1979). And in Donovan v. Scuderi, Judge Wilner
concurred with the court's decision to enforce the woman's claim, but stated: "It is
naive at best to assume that she would have expended $60,000 to buy him clothing,
meals, artwork, etc., if he had never entered into the 'loving' relationship with her,
or had withdrawn from it." 443 A.2d 121, 128 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (Wilner, J.,
concurring).
144. See, e.g., Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 324-25 (La. Ct. App.
1983) (stating that a "concubine" is not allowed to recover in quantum meruit for her
domestic work, but may press a claim for business services), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1206 (1984).
145. By denying recovery, the discourse encourages attempts to stave off adult
responsibility-the law infantilizes the male. Marvin v. Marvin pointed out that
denying recovery promotes the disinclination to marry. The male cohabitant has a
financial incentive to not marry the woman if he knows she is not entitled to any
claim of compensation when the relationship ends. 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976).
At the same time, the male experiences a great need for caring and commitment,
which also carries infantile associations resulting from genderized child care:
Much male fear of feminism is the fear that, in becoming whole human
beings, women will cease to mother men, to provide the breast, the lullaby, the
continuous attention associated by the infant with the mother. Much male fear
of feminism is infantilism-the longing to remain the mother's son, to possess
a woman who exists purely for him.
ADRIENNE RICH, Husband-Right and Father-Right, in ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE
215, 221 (1979).
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Although marriage involves similar psychological dynamics,
when a marriage ends a court need not define and scrutinize
the various emotional factors constituting the marital relation-
ship. The relationship is legally cognizable because the parties
participated in the formalism of a marriage ceremony.'46 At
the time of divorce, the law focuses on property, economic
support, and custody.'47 But if the relationship is not legally
cognizable, more personal aspects of the relationship need to
be brought out in court to establish status.'4 8 To avoid a
psychologically troubling area, the court imposes an entirely
new and totally impersonal relationship on the parties. The
need for caring, the reason for the relationship and the real
benefit received from the caretaker, remains hidden and
uncompensated.
In the same way that lawmakers may find it problematic to
acknowledge the male recipient's emotional dependence, they
also experience psychological difficulty in recognizing the
woman's altruistic caring. To minimize maternal power and
mask infantile needs, they characterize the woman as an
autonomous male. Now the law is able to identify with "him"
as well as with the recipient. Caring, a direct and explicit
expression of connection, poses a danger to the adult "male"
146. For an explanation of the various functions served by legal formalities see
Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-04 (1941).
Legally required marriage formalities are minimal. Although every state requires
a marriage license and records marriage certificates, no particular form of ceremony
is needed. See Glendon, supra note 101, at 681.
147. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., 2 THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES § 14.4, at 32 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that the function of a divorce trial
is to settle custody, property, and maintenance issues and that the termination of the
marriage is no longer a triable issue).
148. This occurs in a claim of common-law marriage. Recognition requires proof
of an agreement to be married and that the parties hold themselves out to the
community as married, cohabitating together for a length of time. See 1 id. § 2.4, at
104-05. Courts focus on the duration and character of the relationship, and
frequently infer an agreement in light of the circumstances, that is, in light of the
fact that the parties are living together as if they are married. Id. at 107-08. There
is a significant difference between the legal treatment of a marital contract and a
contract to provide services, even though the contextual circumstances might be
identical. Common-law marriage is recognized in 14 jurisdictions. See ALA. CODE
§ 30-1-9 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1 (Michie 1991); IDAHO CODE § 32-301 (Michie
1983); IOWA CODE § 595.11 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (1990); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-1-403 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.12 (Baldwin 1991); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 1 (West 1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-23 (1965); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 1.91 (West 1975); Matthews v. Britton, 303 F.2d 408, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
Deter v. Deter, 484 P.2d 805, 806 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Souza v. O'Hara, 395 A.2d
1060, 1062 (R.I. 1978); Weathers v. Bolt, 361 S.E.2d 773, 773 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987).
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caretaker, as well as to the recipient, as a regression and as
a loss of self. Connection dissolves the solid boundary between
the self and other and virtually eliminates the unitary
self.149  The altruist caretaker signifies a selfless self. Fear
of psychic annihilation 150 causes the law to deny the care-
taker's altruism and to reconstruct her motives as self-
interested. Although the law overtly emphasizes the threat to
the recipient's autonomy if compensation is compelled without
consent to be bound, the peril to the autonomy of the recon-
structed male caretaker is just as great. A bargain guards the
boundaries of two egos.
Redefining the relationship as one of commerce instead of
caring has a disparate impact on women (the majority of
caretakers) because adult males do not value their market
services-essentially housework."'' The caretaker never
149. There is an interesting metaphor at work here. The self is described as a
physical container in which the ego is deposited. Giving depletes the container's
contents. Altruistic behavior leads to loss if there is a physical limit to the self as a
boundaried object. If a different metaphor is used, a self that is not a container, but
propertied more like liquid, taking on shapes according to relationship, the
destructive element is not present. For more on metaphor, and an argument that we
reason using metaphors based on early childhood cognitive experiences of our body's
physical properties and limits, see Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense,
Metaphoric Reasoning and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1107,
1130-34, 1147-48, 1150-51 (1989). Perhaps the container metaphor is also a result
of a male's early childhood development. A woman's metaphor would differ because
the growth of self-awareness is experienced as connection with the mother, instead
of as separation from her.
150. Robin West has consummately expressed a possible difference between men's
and women's fears:
The human being, according to legal theory, values autonomy and fears
annihilation, while at the same time he subjectively dreads the alienation that
his love of autonomy inevitably entails. Women, according to feminist theory,
value intimacy and fear separation, while at the same time longing for the
individuation which our fear of separation precludes, and dreading the invasion
which our love of intimacy entails.
West, supra note 4, at 42.
151. In some cohabitation cases and in claims for compensation after providing
services to relatives, the labor must appear to be more than just ordinary housework
in order for the caretaker to obtain recovery. Round-the-clock nursing or commercial
services are often required. See supra note 65; see also Roznowski v. Bozyk, 251
N.W.2d 606, 608 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that because the services were
rendered in a tavern and in connection with business, there is a claim for quantum
meruit recovery even though the parties were living together); Suggs v. Norris, 364
S.E.2d 159, 162-63 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing a claim for the reasonable value
of the services to a caretaker who worked on the decedent's farm, harvested the
produce, drove to markets over a sixty-mile route, and took care of the decedent who
was an alcoholic), cert. denied, 370 S.E.2d 236 (N.C. 1988).
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really wins. She is either Erda, the earth mother, whose
domestic services should be given freely to her children, or
Eve, the seductress, luring adults into making generous
promises of compensation that the law must modify or
break.152 Her reliance on the recipient seems misplaced
because the emotional and interdependent aspects of the
relationship are not openly discussed. Even worse, the
woman's claim for compensation comes from a deeply felt loss
of self that is not recognized or understood in the discourse.
When a relationship ends, the separation diminishes her in a
way that she is unable to explain as material loss. Denying
compensation or compensating her only for the services she
has performed leaves her feeling incomplete, because the
whole person that was part and parcel of the relationship is
not validated.
One possible consequence of our society's choice to relegate
child care to women is that the male creates a system of law
and a theory of relationships that refuses to acknowledge
intimate attachments. We have created neurotic law.153 As
long as women are the primary caretakers of children, their
sons will limit altruism to the traditional family, perpetuating
a divided social world.
IV. REDEFINING THE FAMILY:
COMPENSATING CARETAKERS FOR RELATIONAL Loss
AND ENCOURAGING CO-PARENTING
The law's refusal to recognize relational needs has contri-
buted to our concealing their importance to ourselves. To cure
the neurotic stance of existing law, we should reward selfless
caring on its own terms as an act of altruism, acknowledge the
caretaker's loss, and insist that the need for family connection
be ratified as a part of the human condition. The caretaker
152. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 130, at 147-54. Dinnerstein insists that as long
as women are primary caretakers, men will view them as the "dirty goddess." Id. at
147-49.
153. Male values, the justice model, are just as subjective and as much the
product of social interactions, in particular genderized child care, as women's moral
orientation. Regardless of the debate over values, whether intrinsic to gender or a
reflection of a culture's social divisions, the male approach has been given the voice
of authority at the expense of women as if it were an objective truth.
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should be compensated without resorting to the fiction that
she acted with an expectation to be paid, and her reliance on
the recipient should be validated. By denying the altruistic
elements inherent in the relationship, we encourage fraud and
perjury, as well as contempt for the justice system. A more
open and sincere discourse, centered in the felt experiences of
those involved, in which the caretaker can present the facts
unfiltered by an abstract standard of intent to be paid, brings
the law closer to the social reality of the parties and a true
standard of justice.'
A. Compensating Relational Loss
Various solutions are possible. We could, in a forthright
manner, resurrect common-law marriage.'55 Several com-
mentators have suggested more sophisticated versions of
common-law marriage to alleviate some of the problems
associated with a quasi-legal status. William Reppy is in
favor of creating the status of "lawful cohabitation" so that
parties are entitled to take advantage of income, gift, and
estate tax benefits.
156
Ellen Kandoian turns to partnership law and sensitively
redefines marriage to include homosexual and lesbian relation-
ships. Building on a business partnership model, she defines
154. The very language of law can distance us from each other and hinder
understanding:
[C]ourts should allow all facts to be presented by the parties; they should
encourage the speech of the "legally inarticulate" and include it within the
universe of social realities that the law comprehends .... When law and the
real world meet, we can demand that the world reformulate itself in the
language of law-or we can transform the law by opening it to the language of
the world.
Coombs, supra note 27, at 1657-58 (footnote omitted).
155. See supra note 148 for a list of jurisdictions which recognize common-law
marriage; see also Blumberg, supra note 101, at 1171-78 (surveying legislation
granting legal recognition to cohabitants in Cuba, Israel, Ontario, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom); deFuria, supra note 69, at 219-20 (discussing the legal status of
nonmarital and meretricious relationships in France, Venezuela, Bolivia, Panama,
Sweden, Cuba, and Puerto Rico).
156. William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabi-
tants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677, 1716-22
(1984).
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marriage as an "association of two persons to carry on a
shared life."" 7 A presumption of a shared life arises from
long-term cohabitation. 158  After two years, sufficient time
has passed for at least one of the parties to feel married, and
it is fair to say the relationship is more than a casual friend-
ship.5 9 The doctrines of "unjust enrichment, undue influ-
ence, and abuse of a confidential relationship can be made to
protect economically vulnerable partners. " 6°
Grace Blumberg proposes two different standards. If the
relationship terminates because of death, any "stable cohabita-
tion of any duration" should be treated as a lawful marriage
in order for the surviving "spouse" to be included in intestacy
and elective share statutes.' 6' For purposes of maintenance
and property division, the parties should be treated as
lawfully married if they have lived together for two or more
years or if there is a child.'62 Cohabitants need formal
recognition to afford them protection and rights against third
parties and the state.'63
157. Kandoian, supra note 66, at 1870; see also H. Jay Folberg & William P.
Buren, Domestic Partnership: A Proposal for Dividing the Property of Unmarried
Families, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 453, 480 (1976) (suggesting that unmarried couples
should be referred to as "domestic partners" and that there is a sufficient relationship
to divide the parties' property when there has been "an actual and ostensible family
relationship and a union that has been in existence for a substantial period of time").
158. Kandoian, supra note 66, at 1870.
159. Id. at 1863.
160. Id. at 1872; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1981)
(stating that the contract is voidable by the victim if assent is induced by undue
influence); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1957) (defining a
confidential relationship).
161. Blumberg, supra note 101, at 1166-67. Even if they are named as benefici-
aries in a will, cohabitants are often denied property because the relationship is
considered highly suggestive of undue influence. See deFuria, supra note 69, at 201
n.7.
162. Blumberg, supra note 101, at 1166.
163. Finding housing can be difficult for cohabitants. See, e.g., Donahue v. Fair
Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 46 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
although denying housing to cohabitants is discrimination, ending such discrimina-
tion is not a compelling state interest and is outweighed by a landlord's right to the
free exercise of religion), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992); State by Cooper
v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 1990) (holding that a landlord may refuse to rent
to cohabitants because of his religious beliefs). Employment also can be a problem.
See, e.g., State by McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 872 (Minn.
1985) (finding that it is not discriminatory to refuse employment to an unmarried
cohabitant because an employer is not required to employ persons whose conduct
constitutes criminal behavior under a state fornication statute), appeal dismissed, 478
U.S. 1015 (1986). Social security benefits may be denied. See, e.g., Lynch v. Bowen,
681 F. Supp. 506, 512 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that, in a jurisdiction that does not
recognize common-law marriage, a woman who lived with a man for thirty-eight
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In the bigger picture, however, common-law marriage does
not address the concerns of caretakers who were not sexually
involved with the recipient, but who nevertheless formed a
family relationship. We need to do more than reclassify
marriage. More broadly, we should redefine family to include
all full-time caretakers. Family membership should embrace
the Beatrice Monsteds" 4 and Mary Lou Brookses" 5 of this
world, the many surrogate mothers, daughters, and others
who provide affection and nurturance to the elderly and the
forgotten. Their caring has value above market services and
is an accurate measure of the true degree of family attach-
ment. As family members, they should be granted intestate
succession rights and allowed an elective statutory share in
the deceased's estate.
Living in the same household is not important if the family
unit is stable and the caretaker has been responsible for the
recipient over time. The relationship between caretaker and
recipient can be more permanent than some of the temporary
living arrangements considered a family for regulatory
years is ineligible for a widow's social security benefits). Workers' compensation
claims and unemployment compensation can also be refused. See, e.g., Insurance Co.
of N. Am. v. Jewel, 164 S.E.2d 846, 847 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968) (denying workers'
compensation benefits); Cottrell v. EBI Cos., 743 P.2d 716, 719 (Or. 1987) (denying
a cohabitant the death benefits of workers' compensation because her companion had
moved out a month prior to his death with the intention of terminating the
relationship). But see, e.g., MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 689 P.2d
453, 454 (Cal. 1984) (en banc) (holding that a woman had good cause to quit her job
in order to follow her cohabitant to another state and preserve the family unit, and
was thereby entitled to unemployment compensation if she met other eligibility
requirements). Only a few courts have allowed a cohabitant to press a claim for loss
of consortium. See, e.g., Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (D.N.J.
1980) (holding that under New Jersey law, a cohabitant has standing to bring a claim
for loss of consortium). Bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress has been rejected. See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 588 (Cal. 1989)
(limiting bystander recovery of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress
and loss of consortium to married cohabitants). Wrongful death claims are denied.
See, e.g., Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 184 Cal. Rptr. 390, 392 (Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that a meretricious spouse is not recognized as an "heir" in the wrongful
death statutory scheme).
Some benefits, however, cannot be eliminated. The children of mothers who
receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children and who are living with men who
are not legally obligated to support the children cannot be denied payments. King
v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 329-33 (1968).
164. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text (discussing In re Hatten's
Estate).
165. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (discussing In re Estate of
Steffes).
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purposes.16 If the parties are emotionally interdependent,
and the caretaker has been responsible for ordinary daily
needs such as shopping, housework, meals, and medical
appointments for two years or more, there is a family. There
need not be an exact standard to measure attachment or to
gauge the depth and closeness of a relationship. The defini-
tion of the family varies depending on the particular facts and
the specific needs of the individuals who are involved.
Altruistic caring in a stable relationship best defines the
meaning of family.
The family takes on special significance if the caretaker has
been living with the recipient in a de facto marriage. There is
usually more emotional and economic interdependence than in
other kinds of family relationships. After two years of
cohabitation or the birth of a child, cohabitants should be
presumed legally married.'67 A recipient at this point in
166. The Supreme Court has defined family to include more than the nuclear-
family unit, including grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins who share the same
household. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977). In United States
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1973), for purposes of qualifying for
food stamps, a household included a few unrelated individuals who lived with a tradi-
tional family to communally share expenses. But in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1974) the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that excluded from the
definition of family a community of six unrelated by blood, adoption, or marriage.
Family at times is broad enough to stretch past blood relatives if people are living in
the same household in a stable relationship. See Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi,
568 A.2d 888, 894-95 (N.J. 1990) (stating that ten college students who eat together,
share expenses, and intend to remain a unit throughout college constitute the
functional equivalent of a family); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 313 N.E.2d 756,
757-58 (N.Y. 1974) (stating that a family is a relatively permanent household which
may include foster children).
167. There is, of course, an obstacle to formalizing the relationship if one of the
cohabitants is still legally married. See, e.g., Thomas v. LaRosa, 400 S.E.2d 809,
814-15 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that a plaintiff can not recover from her cohabitant
when he is already married). If the wage earner has failed to dissolve a previous
marriage, he could find that he has incurred more responsibilities than his income
can maintain. Even if he should divorce his previous wife, it is difficult for many
wage earners to support more than one family at the same time. The problem is not
resolved by deciding which family is legally entitled to support. Moreover, even if
there is only one family to provide for, the available income may be inadequate. It
is increasingly clear that private divorce and contract law do not resolve the
underlying problem of women's situation, the fact that they are often dependents in
both formal and informal relationships. Government needs to accept its responsi-
bility to provide a workable scheme of social services and benefits to help families in
need. See Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning
the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS 191, 210 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990) (arguing
for expanded child care leave provisions, flexible workplace hours, wider pension
coverage, retraining, and counseling programs).
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time should be aware of the economic sacrifices a caretaker is
likely to incur as a result of their informal living arrange-
ments. If the relationship ends through death or separation,
benefits and statutory entitlements or property and support
awards should be made available.
Couples who prefer to live together without taking on the
obligations of a marriage could enter into a contract stating
that neither intends to be married. However, the woman, the
one more likely to be economically vulnerable and to lack
power in the relationship, might agree to enter such a contract
only because she has no choice and fears the loss of the
relationship if she does not waive entitlements, including ones
available now-quantum meruit recovery for the value of the
services. To protect caretakers, whose assent to a contract is
suspect, the law should presume that the parties are married,
despite an explicit agreement. This presumption should be
rebuttable only in those cases in which there are no children,
neither party is a full-time caretaker, and neither party has
sacrificed a career opportunity to benefit the other. 6 '
If both parties really prefer not to marry, they are unlikely
to raise children, live together for an extended period, or
become economically dependent on each other. Therefore,
neither party would have an incentive to pursue a claim when
the relationship ends. Whenever the relationship takes on the
appearance of a traditional marriage, it is surely more
plausible to presume that the caretaker would choose to be
married, but lacks the economic power to control the decision
making in the relationship.
Although granting formal recognition monetizes the connec-
tion between the parties, it is an entirely different form of
commodification than evaluating market services. Compensat-
ing the woman's labor minimizes the importance of the
relationship and ignores the woman's values, whereas formal
recognition enhances her self-worth and respects her dignity
as a human being.'69 In fact, there is no way to avoid
168. See Kandoian, supra note 66, at 1863-64 (suggesting that after two years of
cohabitation, the law should presume that the parties are married, rebuttable by
proof of an express agreement to the contrary); see also infra note 193 (arguing that
premarital and settlement agreements are subject to the same pitfalls as an
agreement between cohabitants).
169. Formalizing relationships is a pragmatic solution that can further the
empowerment of some women in a nonideal world. See Margaret J. Radin, The
Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1700-01 (1990).
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commodification. Both the compensation of market services
and the refusal of all recovery denies that caring has any
value. Rejecting her claim because of sexual intimacy reduces
the woman to nothing more than the seller of a sexual
commodity. All outcomes are evaluations of the importance
we place on relational needs. The proposed change has the
advantage of compensating the caretaker on her own justice
scale of values. In this case, putting a dollar amount on the
relationship is not self-reductive and does not mean that the
self is only worth that amount.
170
Legitimacy, unfortunately, still does not provide a long-
term caretaker and/or mother with much in the way of
recovery if the relationship ends. Her inability to insist that
the relationship be formalized because she is economically
dependent on the wage earner is remedied, but not her
underlying dependency. Placing the caretaker in the same
situation that many wives face only underscores their
common problem. Many women are raised to be caretakers
and to see the world in relational terms,' 7' and many care-
takers are vulnerable parties when relationships end.1
72
At the time of divorce, marriage becomes a business relation-
ship between self-sufficient partners whose contributions
170. See Marjorie M. Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parent-
hood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 336-37 ("The
critical issue is not whether something involves monetary exchange as one of its
aspects, but whether it is treated as reducible solely to its monetary features.").
171. See supra text accompanying notes 130-35.
172. The present state of family law does not acknowledge the disparity in
economic strength between the parties and is a contributing factor to the feminization
of poverty. See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contra-
diction and Social Change, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789, 826-42 (arguing that the advent
of no-fault divorce, and the model of marriage as an equal partnership, has led courts
to look at the contributions each partner has made to the marriage in allocating
property, instead of focusing on future needs); Glendon, supra note 101, at 707
(arguing that emphasizing autonomy and equality at divorce downplays the wage-
earner's responsibility in a highly industrialized society, in which women are often
exclusively devoted to child care and are dependent on the husband/wage-earner);
Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences
of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1251 (1981)
[hereinafter Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce] (noting that in 1971 men in
California experienced a 42% improvement in their standard of living following
divorce, while women experienced a 73% loss). Her study has been reprinted and
enlarged to include more recent findings. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985) [hereinafter WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION].
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determine entitlements.17 The justice model of reasoning
prevails, and the woman is treated as if she were in the same
position as the wage earner. Married or not, the rubric of
contract clouds the substantive inequality of bargaining power
between men and women and the disparity in their socio-
economic situations.'74 The various policy concerns that
dominate the existing legal discourse in contract and family
law do not grasp the reality of women's lives and fail to
include women's values. Statutes regulating the family grow
out of a background of gender-structured social institutions.
Bargain theory is geared to the needs of the commercial
setting, not the caretaker's world.
In light of the genderized nature of the caretaker's claim, I
suggest that we welcome the nontraditional family into the
positive law, without losing sight of the caretaker's economic
plight. Along with accepting the many variations of the
nontraditional family that exist in our society, we must also
recognize the disadvantages of women's position in the
traditional family and upgrade the value of the caretaking
role. We need to remedy the substantive inequality in
property and support awards at divorce and compensate all
long-term caretakers and/or those with children, in traditional
and nontraditional marriages, for the harm they have really
173. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307(a) (Alternative A), 9A
U.L.A. 238-39 (1987) (stating that a court should consider "the contribution of the
spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit" in apportioning property).
174. Employed wives still take on the burden of housework and child care. See
OKIN, supra note 8, at 5; Glendon, supra note 101, at 707-08. Women are more likely
to forego career opportunities after the birth of a child. During marriage many
women gravitate towards low-paying jobs and work part-time. They remain
economically dependent, even if they shoulder full-time responsibility in the
workplace and in the home. On the job they continue to face discrimination. Even
though they make up over 40% of the workforce, there is no national profamily policy
in this country requiring employers to grant maternity benefits or to provide
employees with paid parental leave. Working hours conflict with family needs,
compelling women to choose between their careers and their families. See Finley,
supra note 95, at 1125-28. Nationwide, women earn approximately 35% less than
similarly employed men, and after four years in college earn the equivalent of men
with an eighth-grade education. Mark A. Sessums, What Are Wives' Contributions
Worth upon Divorce?: Toward Fully Incorporating Partnership into Equitable
Distribution, 41 FLA. L. REV. 987, 995 n.27 (1989) (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 20 MONEY INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS OF FAMILIES AND
PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1987, at 7 (1987) and WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, 20 FACTS OF WOMEN WORKERS 2 (1980)). Fifty-four percent of all
single-parent families in Florida live below the poverty level and more than 90% of
these are headed by women. Bias Study, supra note 141, at 806.
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suffered, the loss of the relationship.175 The male metaphor
of marriage as a partnership excludes a woman's ethic of care
and the high value she ascribes to the relationship as one that
will endure over time. 176  In long-term relationships, and in
those relationships with children, the woman is more likely to
be dependent and less able to become self-sufficient above a
minimum level.
In jurisdictions which have adopted equitable distribution
schemes, the courts have considerable discretion in the
partitioning of assets. As a result, the property division in
any given case will be unpredictable because it is based on the
court's intuition of what is fair.177 Because domestic work is
175. Evaluating relational loss has become to some extent an integral part of an
established scheme of personal injury damages. In addition to allowing either spouse
to recover for loss of consortium, some jurisdictions permit parents to recover
compensation for loss of a child's affection and companionship. See, e.g., Shockley v.
Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495, 501 (Wis. 1975). But a child's claim for loss of parental
consortium is not well received. See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d
858, 865 (Cal. 1977). For a criticism of the refusal to expand the claim to include
damages for lost society and companionship to parents, children, and spouses, see
Jean C. Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an
Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590 (1976). See also
Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts
Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 48-51 (1989) (noting the discrimination against
women in personal injury cases and the law's hostility to relational loss). The law
does commodify relational loss, but only if there is physical injury caused by a third
party and only within traditional family relationships.
An opposing perspective has been developed by Richard Abel. See Richard L. Abel,
Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 185, 195-96 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (arguing that
the expansion of tort remedies for injuries to relationships commodifies love and
implies that all relationships have a monetary value).
If one spouse abuses the other, some courts provide a special exception to
interspousal immunity, permitting an alimony award to include any medical expenses
or loss of earning potential. See, e.g., Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 24 (Fla. 1982).
Separate tort actions for personal injury, but not for emotional distress, can also be
pursued at divorce. See, e.g., Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127, 131-32 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989). Physical injury indicates the degree of harm a woman is willing to endure to
preserve the relationship and is a symptom of the woman's situation. Recognizing
the loss of the relationship differs from these halfway measures. It is not a return
to fault-based divorce, but an acknowledgment of the unequal division of labor in
most marriages.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90 (discussing a caretaker's loss of
opportunities and belief that the relationship is permanent).
177. Suzanne Reynolds has studied the results of divorce reform in various
equitable distribution jurisdictions. Although modern statutes direct courts to
consider need as the appropriate determinant of property division and to turn to
alimony if the assets are insufficient to provide for the economically vulnerable
spouse, courts instead emphasize marital contributions, addressing need, if at all,
through alimony awards. Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division
and Alimony: The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 827,
870-71,888-89 (1988); see also Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's,
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difficult to quantify, and not held in high regard, caretaker
contributions are consistently underestimated. Without an
established fair market value, the worth of domestic services
becomes a matter of judicial valuation. Decisions lend
themselves to gender bias. The percentage of marital property
the woman receives is either far less than an equal amount or
equal to the husband's share, despite her need for a greater
award. 7 ' In some community property states, courts tend
to favor the separate property concept in classifying what
belongs to the marital community, and any increase in value
of the separate property is retained by the owner. This
usually results in the important income-producing assets
remaining the property of the original owner, traditionally
44 LA. L. REV. 1553, 1556 (1984) (discussing equitable distribution schemes in
general); Sessums, supra note 174, at 1028 (discussing equitable distribution awards
in Florida).
Florida's equitable distribution statute does not mandate equal distribution. FLA.
STAT. § 61.075 (1991). There is considerable discretion to award the caretaker less
than half the assets if her contributions are considered to be of little value. See, e.g.,
Lester v. Lester, 547 So. 2d 1241, 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that
awarding the wife one quarter of the estate is equitable because her role was
"ornamental" in twenty-three years of marriage).
Martha Fineman suggests that women who are custodial parents be awarded the
home because child support seldom reflects the actual costs of raising a child and
support orders are rarely enforced. The most valuable, and often the only, asset at
divorce is the family home. See Fineman, supra note 172, at 833. The costs of a
college education are usually not a part of child support and many women, if able to
do so, assume this burden. Id. at 829. As the costs of higher education increase and
support awards decrease, however, fewer women will be able to manage. Id. Child
support frequently fails to reflect the actual cost of paying someone to care for a
child, because the custodial parent is awarded little or no maintenance and needs to
work full-time. See Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce, supra note 172, at 1236-37.
178. Wives in Florida, for example, typically receive only their dower right,
approximately one-fourth of the estate. Sessums, supra note 174, at 1009-10. The
husband's contributions are more easily measured. Florida courts usually award as
much as 65-75% of the marital assets to the husband. See Bias Study, supra note
141, at 816. In New York and New Jersey, equitable distribution standards usually
result in women receiving less than one-half the assets. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION, supra note 172, at 106-07. In states with a statutory presumption of
equal distribution, wives are more likely to receive half the marital assets. See
Reynolds, supra note 177, at 866-70. However, an equal division fails to substan-
tively equalize the living standards of the parties. The older housewife, without
skills or experience, needs a greater share of the assets to recapture the economic
security she has lost by divorce. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note
172, at 105. Equal division also works a hardship in community property jurisdic-
tions. In California, courts frequently order the sale of the family home to
accommodate the standard of equal division. Id. at 104. On the other hand, judges
are reluctant to force the sale of a business, considering the wage earner's financial
situation more important than the children's emotional and psychological need to
remain in the family home. Id. at 97.
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assumed to be the man.179 In marital property regimes, the
most valuable asset, the increase in the wage earner's earning
potential during the years of the marriage, is often not
divisible.180 In general, men's earnings increase with age,
peaking as men reach their fifties and sixties. Women,
however, earn most of their income while they are young,
twenty-five to thirty-five years old."8 ' Divorce before the
male wage earner has achieved his full earning potential
deprives the caretaker of her expectation to share in the
increased wealth. Even worse, the woman past thirty-five
179. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 172, at 97. Weitzman
reports that the shift from fault-based to no-fault divorce has scarcely affected the
pattern of awarding the business to the husband. Id. A business, a professional
association, or a corporation are often the family's main source of income. In Texas,
profits from a separate business are community property, but any increase in the
value of the business retains separate property status. See Bea A. Smith, The
Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689,
707-08 (1990). A separate asset brought into the marriage is also separate property,
even if community funds or labor increased its value. Id. at 710. California's use of
an equitable apportionment doctrine also tends to favor separate property. A
substantial part of the profit and growth of a separate business can be classified as
noncommunity property under this regime, leaving little to award to the community
pool. Id. at 720-22.
180. See Bias Study, supra note 141, at 804 (noting that despite the gender-
neutral language of Florida's divorce legislation, men generally receive more than
half the marital assets and "typically leave with their enhanced earning capacity
intact"). In a postindustrialized, highly specialized economy, wealth is not measured
solely by the accumulation of property. An individual's earning capacity, the result
of a significant educational investment and years spent on the job attaining practical
skills, has replaced more traditional notions of wealth such as land, shares, and other
tangible holdings. Courts, however, resist redefining property to include these new
forms of wealth. See Smith, supra note 179, at 736-38.
For instance, some jurisdictions refuse to include the husband's enhanced earning
ability, such as his professional degree or the goodwill of a business, when classifying
marital property. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 454 So. 2d 1006, 1008-09 (Ala. Civ. App.
1984); In re Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978); Sweeney v. Sweeney, 534 A.2d
1290, 1291 (Me. 1987); Hodge v. Hodge, 520 A.2d 15, 16-17 (Pa. 1986); Helm v. Helm,
345 S.E.2d 720, 721 (S.C. 1986); Beeler v. Beeler, 715 S.W.2d 625, 626-27 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1986); Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 540-42 (Utah 1991); Hoak v. Hoak,
370 S.E.2d 473, 476-77 (W. Va. 1988). But see O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712
(N.Y. 1985) (holding that a medical license constitutes marital property).
Some jurisdictions refuse to recognize professional goodwill as a marital asset.
See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 648 P.2d 218, 222-23 (Kan. 1982); Depner v. Depner, 478
So. 2d 532, 533-35 (La. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 480 So. 2d 744 (1986); Nail v.
Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 763-64 (Tex. 1972). There are considerable differences over
the definition of goodwill and how it should be valued. See 2 CLARK, supra note 147,
§ 16.5, at 199-203 (1987); see also WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note
172, at 124-29 (examining cases where one spouse supported the other while in
professional school and explaining how different jurisdictions treated the degree upon
divorce).
181. See Bias Study, supra note 141, at 815.
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frequently has sacrificed her earning capacity to the well-
being of the family.1 12  At divorce she is left in the worst
position possible.
The metaphor of marriage as a partnership is needlessly
confusing and causes women great harm. There is no entity
in which the parties deposited their contributions except
what is created, "thingified," by law. Courts fail to recognize
that contribution is only need in disguise. Long-term
domestic services prove the depth of the caretaker's depen-
dence on the wage earner's stream of income, not her
independence or ownership of financial assets as a partner.
The partnership metaphor also ignores many caretakers'
inability to become self-sufficient when assessing their need
for support. In most divorces, assets are limited to the
family home and maintenance is the most certain means
available to provide for the caretaker's future. ls The years
spent in the home without pay, at best acquiring market
skills of minimal worth,184 as well as the costs of child-
rearing in the future because of inadequate and poorly
enforced child support awards,'85 are not realistically taken
182. See infra note 184.
183. See Bias Study, supra note 141, at 816, 818 (stating that in most divorces
there is little property to divide and alimony is one means to compensate for women's
lost economic opportunities).
184. Mark Sessums observes that "[a] homemaker's earning capacity depends, in
part, on the length of time she has placed her family at a higher priority than her
career or education." Sessums, supra note 174, at 995 n.27. When a person is out
of the labor force for any significant period of time, her job skills tend to "atrophy."
Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Women's Earnings Reexamined, 13 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 118, 118 (1978). Salary depreciation increases as the level of education
rises. Id. at 121.
185. A man is rarely required to pay more than one-third of his net income for
child and spousal support. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce, supra note 172, at
1234. More than half the women awarded child support fail to receive it. WEITZMAN,
THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 172, at 262 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-23, NO. 124, p. 1 (1983)). One
study revealed that two-thirds of fathers paid less for child support than they spent
on monthly car payments. Lucy M. Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support
Cases: An Empirical Study of Establishment and Enforcement of Child Support
Orders in the Denver District Court, 57 DENVER L.J. 21, 36 (1979). Child support
arrearages are easily forgiven and payments are routinely reduced. See Bias Study,
supra note 141, at 825. Compelling payment, on the other hand, may require an
attorney's services, the cooperation of an indifferent bureaucracy in the office of the
State's attorney, and simply knowing where the father is located-all burdens on the
custodial parent. See WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 172, at
283-95; Nan D. Hunter, Child Support Law and Policy: The Systematic Imposition
of Costs on Women, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 13-14 (1983).
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into account. Permanent support requires proof of a special
need, and most wives receive only temporary assistance. '
In 1989, 858,000 children lived in households with two unmarried adults of the
opposite sex; in 1990 the number rose to 891,000. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MAR. 1990, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, SERIES P-20, NO. 450 (1991). Despite these numbers, and although there
is an equal right to support for illegitimate children, see Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535, 538 (1973), these children face special problems. When paternity actions end in
settlement agreements, jurisdictions disagree as to whether the compromise binds all
parties, including the child. See 1 CLARK, supra note 147, § 5.4, at 344-45. In
contrast, the child support orders of previously married parties are always
modifiable, even if based on agreements. Id. § 18.2 at 366-79. For a general
discussion of the legal issues surrounding illegitimate children, see id. §§ 5.1-5.5.
The Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA) provides for
an adjudication of paternity in the context of a RURESA proceeding. REVISED UNIF.
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 27, 9B U.L.A. 381 (1968). However,
the woman is often not present at the trial and is unable to effectively present her
case or directly cross-examine the putative father since the proceeding occurs in the
jurisdiction in which there is personal jurisdiction over the male obligor. See, e.g.,
Hodge v. Maith, 435 So. 2d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that, in an action
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, the alleged father's state
of residence should resolve the issues of paternity and child support).
186. Lenore Weitzman's studies in California reveal that only 19% of divorced
women in Los Angeles and San Francisco were awarded alimony in 1968. In 1977,
after no-fault divorce statutes became widespread, the percentage had declined to 17.
Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce, supra note 172, at 1221. The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act states that maintenance should only be awarded if
property is insufficient to provide for a spouse's needs and the spouse is unable to be
self-supporting through employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition
prevents the spouse from accepting employment outside of the house. UNIF.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 347-48 (1987). In Florida, courts
are directed to decide on an alimony award only after the assets have been allocated.
FLA. STAT. ch. 61.075(8) (1991). The women who receive permanent support are
usually young mothers with small children and older women in long-term marriages
who are unable to work because of age or poor health. Weitzman, The Economics of
Divorce, supra note 172, at 1222. Weitzman's study also indicates, however, that
these two groups have experienced a decline in support awards. Id. at 1222. One-
third of the women who were full-time housewives in long-term marriages, and
supposedly eligible for permanent maintenance, were not awarded any alimony. Id.
In 1977, only 22% of mothers with minor children were awarded spousal support in
addition to child support. Id. at 1225. The median time span on rehabilitative
alimony was just over two years, hardly sufficient time to become self-supporting.
Id. at 1226. In Florida, judges unrealistically assume a middle-aged woman will be
able to obtain work, regardless of her educational background, length of marriage, or
time away from employment. See Bias Study, supra note 141, at 814. Permanent
alimony has been almost entirely discarded, even though women suffer a dispropor-
tionate impact on their future when property is used as the sole method of
distributing marital assets. Id. at 816; see also Marsha Garrison, The Economics of
Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing Results, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSS-
ROADS, supra note 167, at 75, 83 (citing statistics proving a decline from 78% to 37%
in awards of permanent alimony between 1978 and 1984 in New York); Reynolds,
supra note 177, at 902 n.348 ("[I]n 1985 only 15% of ever-divorced or currently-
separated women in the United States ... received an award of alimony.") (citing
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UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES, SERIES P-23, NO. 152, Child Support and Alimony: 1985
(Advance Report), p.6 (1987)). For a thoughtful recounting of the many disadvantages
faced by women at divorce, citing numerous supportive studies, see OKUN, supra note
8, at 160-67.
Although the factors considered when awarding maintenance vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, Florida's statute is fairly representative. It states in
pertinent part:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant alimony
to either party, which alimony may be rehabilitative or permanent in nature.
In any award of alimony, the court may order periodic payments or payments
in lump sum or both. The court may consider the adultery of either spouse and
the circumstances thereof in determining the amount of alimony, if any, to be
awarded....
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony or maintenance, the court shall
consider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of each party.
(d) The financial resources of each party, the nonmarital and the
marital assets and liabilities distributed to each.
(e) When applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable such party to find appropriate
employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not
limited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education, and
career building of the other party.
(g) All sources of income available to either party.
The court may consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice
between the parties.
FLA. STAT. ch. 61.08(1)-(2) (1991).
Unlike a pure partnership model, Florida's statute reverts, in part, to fault to
decide on support awards. For example, the statute allows the court to consider the
adultery of either spouse when determining the amount of alimony. Id. ch. 61.08(1);
see also Sessums, supra note 174, at 990 n.6. Because most women are not self-
supporting, they are more likely to request alimony; thus, their past sexual conduct
is more likely to be used against them. The statute appears to be gender-neutral, but
like most gender-neutral rules, it is gender-biased in fact. Florida courts have
refused to acknowledge the discrimination that underlies alimony determinations.
See, e.g., Pacheco v. Pacheco, 246 So. 2d 778, 782 (Fla. 1971) (holding that a denial
of alimony due to adultery does not violate due process or equal protection), appeal
dismissed, 404 U.S. 804 (1971).
Florida's focus on the woman's physical condition, age, and education is typical of
the partnership approach. In effect, the wife has the burden to prove she is morally
and physically worthy of an award. Florida's approach purports to reward the "good
girl," the traditional woman, who cared for her family without developing independ-
ent market skills and who is an innocent party in the divorce action. But the reward
is an illusion. Her contributions remain undervalued. If she varies from the
traditional model of the good wife, she is punished, either for her fault-based conduct
or for her failure to conform to the domestic contribution model. The factors listed
Redefining the Family
Older women and women with children are unlikely to find
highly paid work." 7
in Chapter 61.08 describe perfect Stepford wives, what men want women to be,
enlisting the law to compel them to conform to male expectations.
187. Over one-third of all divorces occur after 10 years of marriage and 20%
involve those 45 and older. Bias Study, supra note 141, at 807. Most divorced
women will work in service industries, for instance, as secretaries or clerks,
waitresses or hairdressers. Id. at 815. Lenore Weitzman states the following:
[D]ivorce is a financial catastrophe for most women: in just one year they
experience a dramatic decline in income and a calamitous drop in their standard
of living. It is difficult to imagine how they survive the severe economic
deprivation: every single expenditure that one takes for granted-clothing, food,
housing, heat-must be cut to one-half or one-third of what one is accustomed
to. No wonder that more divorced women report that they are in a constant
financial crisis after divorce and that they are perpetually worried about not
being able to pay their bills.
Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce, supra note 172, at 1252 (footnotes omitted).
In 1980, the entire income of almost half of all separated and divorced women came
from their own earnings. SUZANNE M. BIANCHI & DAPHNE SPAIN, AMERICAN WOMEN
IN TRANSITION 206 (1986). Nationwide figures on the difference in income between
men and women are alarming. The per-capita income of divorced women was 56%
of the income of divorced men in 1980. BIANCHI & SPAIN, supra, at 30-32, 205-07,
216--18.
More than statistics, personal experiences bring home the gravity of women's
situation. I have shared the pain of my friends, middle-aged women compelled to sell
insurance from door to door, to open gift boutiques in the hope they can depend on
their friends, or to attempt to rebuild a career abandoned years ago. College-
educated, from middle-class backgrounds, they are caught in the transitional stages
of a society that increasingly believes women are equal to men despite their lack of
preparation to survive in a new world. They are deprived of their homes, their
futures, and their dignity. These women are unlikely to remarry because of their age.
See BIANCHI & SPAIN, supra, at 37 (stating that "[t]he younger the age at divorce, the
greater is the probability of remarriage"). Even friendships end. Many of their
friends have deserted them because the friendships developed from the husband's
occupation and social status, and old friends now socialize with the ex-husband and
his new wife. These women face an uncertain future alone.
When I describe the situation of these older women to my female students they tell
me that they will not find themselves in the same position. The- law has changed.
There has been a substantial increase in women's rights. Moreover, women in their
twenties have been raised in a different cultural environment than women in their
forties. I then ask my students if they are or intend to be married and if they want
to have children. Most see themselves as someday becoming mothers. They believe
in a world in which it is possible for women to self-actualize both professionally and
personally, and so do I.
Nevertheless, despite the gains that women have made during the past twenty-five
years, including increased participation in the labor force and the passage of laws
prohibiting gender discrimination, women still face substantial obstacles. Eighty
percent of the women in the workforce are employed in low-paying jobs without
benefits, such as clerical, retail, and service positions. Wendy Johnson, Model
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The partnership metaphor also assumes that connections
between the parties are capable of being severed. In truth,
despite divorce, many relationships are effectively permanent
because the parties are tied together by their children or by
the caretaker's economic needs. Considering the numerous
modifications and court appearances that can follow an
initial decree, often the result of the wage earner's failure to
pay child support, 1 8  there is no such thing, in many cases,
as total dissolution." 9 In assuming that there is a com-
plete severance, courts are inclined to view the man's
standard of living as a constant, and if the resources of the
parties are scarce, as is usually the case, the woman absorbs
the loss instead of both equally bearing the brunt of less
Programs Prepare Women for the Skilled Trades, in WOMEN, WORK, AND SCHOOL:
OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION AND THE ROLE OF EDUCATION 140, 140 (Leslie R. Wolfe
ed., 1991) [hereinafter WOMEN, WORK, AND SCHOOL]. Women's access to traditionally
male occupations, such as the skilled trades, is blocked. Id. at 143. Even in unions
with a high percentage of women members, leadership positions in unions are
generally held by men; these union officials frequently work with employers to
preserve gender barriers. EPSTEIN, supra note 131, at 151. Women who enter high-
prestige professions receive subtle hints that they are welcome only in lower echelon
positions of little power. Id. at 155-56. For a survey of gender bias in the corporate
world, science, medicine, and the law, see id. at 153-64.
Women face societal barriers from an early age. The school system reflects and
contributes to stereotypical notions of the social roles of males and females. Studies
indicate that teachers interact more with boys than girls. For example, they praise
boys more frequently and are more likely to ask boys complex and abstract questions.
David Sadker & Myra Sadker, Sexism in American Education: The Hidden
Curriculum, in WOMEN, WORK, AND SCHOOL, supra, at 57, 58.
Most importantly, however, our culture persists in maintaining a society in which
women's lives are organized around child care. See BIANCHI & SPAIN, supra, at
103-08 (examining the increase in the number of families maintained by women).
As long as this factor is present, women's choices are constrained and their individual
aspirations are curtailed.
188. See WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 172, at 285-95.
189. Unlike the American model, in which support awards must be modified by
expensive court actions, in France, West Germany, Sweden, and other European
countries, child support rises automatically with the cost-of-living index. MARY ANN
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 88 (1987). Moreover, in these
countries there is a positive social policy stressing the importance of family needs.
The state bears the risk of collecting unpaid child support, and the custodial parent
is advanced the amount due. Id. at 89. Because of the many public benefits and
services, the income differential between men and women is significantly less in
continental Europe than in the United States. An unmarried, unemployed mother
of two in the United States lives on half the average American production worker's
wage, whereas her European counterpart lives on 67-94% of an average production
worker's wage. Id. at 90.
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income."9 The woman's decline in living standard can be
even greater because she often takes on the actual costs of
raising the children. 9 '
The permanent financial connection between the parties
needs to be recognized, and the wage earner held responsible
for the caretaker's loss. 9 2  Compensating relational loss,
instead of measuring contributions, more accurately depicts
the reality of divorce, and protects those who are unable to
protect themselves in contract or status. Unless there is a
restructuring of the division of labor, including the degender-
ization of child care, and until workplace expectations are
regulated to allow for family responsibilities, the caretaker's
dependence on the relationship in traditional and nontradi-
tional marriages should be presumed at the time of dissolution
so as to reflect existing socioeconomic conditions. In addition,
courts should presume that an express prenuptial or settle-
ment agreement in which a long-term caretaker or mother
waives maintenance or any other family rights is unconscion-
able. To allow the agreement to control ignores the disparity
in bargaining power which allows the male wage-earner to
impose unfair terms on the woman.'
93
190. See Reynolds, supra note 177, at 911.
191. See supra note 185.
192. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 179, at 743 (suggesting a theory of marital
enterprise liability, basing awards on detrimental reliance). Margaret Brinig and
June Carbone turn to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts for breach of contract
remedies, measuring losses incurred in reliance on the marital contract. At divorce,
the losses include the woman's sacrifice of her career and foregone opportunities to
enter into another marriage. See Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance
Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855, 870-71 & nn.69-70 (1988); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(b) (1981).
Considering the annual divorce rate and the fact that every year divorce affects
the lives of more than three million people in the United States, OKIN, supra note 8,
at 160, divorce insurance might not be a bad idea. However, the men who tend to
avoid their obligations after a divorce are also unlikely candidates to voluntarily
procure insurance.
193. In cases involving cohabitants, a presumption of unconscionability is
particularly apt. See Kandoian, supra note 66, at 1842 (commenting that one "has
to be concerned about the exercise of power that led to the informality of their
arrangement" in the first place); see also Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 735-36
(Colo. 1982) (holding that a waiver of all support in a prenuptial agreement is
voidable if unconscionable). But see Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20
(Fla. 1962) (holding that as long as the wife understood her rights, signed voluntarily,
and had full disclosure of her husband's assets, the provisions in the prenuptial
agreement were enforceable).
Settlement agreements need to be scrutinized by the courts before the terms become
a part of a judgment. Caretakers are often vulnerable to economic concessions,
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Instead of separating property and support into two piece-
meal dispositions, one comprehensive scheme of recovery is all
that is required. All assets should be family property.1 94
The family's resources, regardless of the time or the source of
acquisition, including property held before marriage (or before
living together), devises, bequests, and gifts, as well as the
spouses' earning potential and nonvested and vested pension
rights, are to be pooled into a common fund. When allocating
resources, courts attempt to establish the same standard of
living for both parties in the future.19 The caretaker, as the
mainstay of the household, should be given the recognition her
role implies and not be required to prove her entitlement.
fearing a child custody battle if the case proceeds to trial. See WEITZMAN, THE
DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 172, at 310-18; see also Bias Study, supra note 141,
at 819 (reporting that attorneys testified before the Commission that men threaten
custody as a bargaining tool and that this is "standard practice"); Richard Neely, The
Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE
L. & POLICY REV. 168, 177-78 (1984) (describing a case in which an attorney
counseled a husband to threaten a custody fight in order to achieve a better
settlement). Men's and women's values also play a role in negotiation. Men tend to
be focused on the money issues and on their rights. Because women prefer to
maintain a positive relationship after divorce and often depend on the male's
willingness to pay for future support, they are more willing to compromise in
reaching a settlement. Also, women are likely to devalue their contributions,
agreeing to less than their legal entitlements. See WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLU-
TION, supra note 172, at 313; see also GLENDON, supra note 189, at 96 (arguing that
the greatest harm occurs in private ordering, 90% of all divorce cases, and that
negotiations would change if both parties knew that courts would act in the interests
of the children).
194. Mary Ann Glendon proposes that marital and nonmarital assets be
commingled as family property to provide for the needs of minor children. Glendon,
supra note 177, at 1559. But a childless caretaker or one with adult children who has
devoted the greater part of her life to her family is equally entitled to family assets.
In long-term relationships, couples tend to pool their combined resources, including
gifts, bequests, and devised property. They are unlikely to think in terms of "yours"
and "mine." They share what is acquired for the benefit and utility of the family
unit. Even in two-career marriages, one career often plays a secondary role. One
income is used for expenses so that the other is available for investment purposes.
Both, however, expect to enjoy the fruits of the property acquired. See Susan W.
Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REV.
1, 13 (1977).
195. See Reynolds, supra note 177, at 911-12 (proposing that courts equalize the
post-divorce standard of living of both parties); see also WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION, supra note 172, at 390 (arguing that with regard to older women,
support rules should aim to equalize the standards of living of the two parties after
divorce). Weitzman favors four presumptions at divorce following a long marriage:
a presumption that future earnings and earning capacity are marital assets, a
presumption that these assets should be shared, a presumption that support awards
should equalize the living standards of the parties, and a presumption of permanent
support. Id. at 390-93.
Redefining the Family
Housework and personal services, which epitomize the
woman's altruistic caring as an expression of her value
system, created and sustained the family at the caretaker's
expense. Permanent maintenance should become the estab-
lished norm, with the wage earner assuming the burden to
prove an exception. A short-term marriage, without children,
in which the caretaker has not sacrificed her potential career
to the relationship, is one example of a potential exception.
Because there is no meaningful distinction between alimony
and child-support awards, as both are used to meet family
needs, support is more accurately classified as family pay-
ments. To ensure that the caretaker lives at the same level as
the wage earner in the future, the presumption of dependency
allows for permanent support in most cases. If the resources
are unable to preserve the marital standard of living, both
should share equally in the decline in living standard. The
husband's financial future is effectively tied to the caretaker's
needs, honoring a woman's relational ethic of care and the
extent of her loss. The caretaker's values are thus brought
into what we now can justly describe as family law.
B. The Need for Co-Parenting
In suggesting various legal reforms, I am mindful that the
economic disadvantages inherent in the caretaker role are not
resolved. The family/market dichotomy socially reproduces
itself by women raising daughters who are dependent on
men.196 Moreover, celebrating women's values can be decep-
tive, a "false consciousness""' that ensnares women to
welcome their own dependency. 19 Formalizing de facto
196. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
197. By "false consciousness," I refer to the notion that oppressed groups at times
experience the world through the dominant cultural ideology and thereby are deluded
into accepting the terms of their own domination. See, e.g., Alan Freeman, Racism,
Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295, 322-23 (1988) (suggesting that people's experiences of the
world may sometimes be distorted by "the prevailing structures of thought").
198. Catharine MacKinnon insists that women value caring because they are
dependent on men: "[Mien have valued women according to the care they give."
MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 51. Hence, to MacKinnon, the ethic of care is not a
woman's value and is in fact masculine at its core. She asks the following:
Why do women become these people, more than men, who represent these
values? . . . For me, the answer is clear: the answer is the subordination of
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marriages and creating presumptions of dependency seem-
ingly further the institutionalization of genderized social
roles.' 99 But to refuse all relief could be even worse.2 °°
The current state of divorce law partially attempts to take
women's dependency into account through equitable distribu-
tion or community property schemes. In addition, in nontradi-
tional marriages, courts sympathetic to the caretaker, aware
that she lacks saleable skills and is unable to compete in the
market in the same way as her male partner, compensate her
labor through the device of finding that she acted with an
women. That does not mean that I throw out those values. Those are nice
values; everyone should have them. I'm not saying that taking these values
seriously would not transform discourse .... The articulation of the voice of the
victim is crucial because laws about victimization typically are made by people
with power ....
James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, supra note 4, at 74; see also Radin, supra note
90, at 1930 n.279, 1932 n.286 (observing that a surrogate mother might actually be
reinforcing oppressive gender roles even though the surrogate subjectively feels she
is behaving altruistically).
199. I am aware that presumptions of dependency foster an image of women as
weak and helpless, incapable of surviving without men. From my perspective,
however, divorce law should reflect reality and operate to alleviate the distress of
women who are dependent in fact. In the past, some feminists have argued against
special rights for women, such as maternity leave policies, and in favor of equal
rights for similar reasons, disliking and fearing gender-specific laws that perpetuate
neo-Victorian images of women. See Finley, supra note 95, at 1145-46. The special
treatment versus equal treatment debate translates into nothing more than a
disagreement over rhetoric: whether we prefer the portrayal of women as essentially
the same as men or different from them, possessing unique needs. For a further
discussion of this debate, see id. at 1142-63.
Insisting on formal equality instead of result equality does not alter patriarchy.
In real life, women are not similarly situated to men and lack both economic
opportunities and power. The special needs of women are notinnate characteristics
of gender; rather, they are artifacts of hierarchy. Acknowledging that some women
are dependent, and thus that the presumption is grounded in fact, allows the
socioeconomic position of these women to be included in the discourse. The
presumption is not a description of any essential characteristic of womankind.
200. In her discussion of prostitution and surrogate mothering, Radin calls this
choice the "double bind":
If we now permit commodification, we may exacerbate the oppression of
women-the suppliers. If we now disallow commodification-without what I
have called the welfare-rights corollary, or large-scale redistribution of social
wealth and power-we force women to remain in circumstances that they
themselves believe are worse than becoming sexual commodity-suppliers ....
This dilemma of transition is the double bind.
Radin, supra note 90, at 1916-17 (footnotes omitted); see also Radin, supra note 169,
at 1701-04 (characterizing the double bind as a "problem of transition" resolved by
pragmatic decisions as we progress towards a new vision of the meaning of gender).
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expectation of a reward. All these methods of compensation
end in awarding women little more than quantum meruit.
Openly acknowledging women's dependency, in traditional and
in nontraditional relationships, is more effective, providing a
better understanding of women's social position and more
compensation to meet their needs. To protect all caretakers
and to allow their voices as victims to be heard, we should
compensate the actual loss, that is, the relationship itself.
To change the underlying inequality itself, we need to create
an environment in which it is possible to structurally redefine
social roles within the family so that men and women share
parenting and domestic responsibilities. Co-parenting helps
position women on a more equal footing with men in the
market, and thereby makes them less dependent on a relation-
ship to survive.201 In so doing, we do not lose the ethic of
care that has developed out of women's situation. Women's
values need not be to their disadvantage or unique to gender.
Co-parenting could make it possible for maleness also to mean
connection because the male primary caretaker would be
internalized as a part of the young male self, in the same way
that the female caretaker is internalized by the female
child.2 °2 It could help transform the engrained ambivalence
201. Co-parenting ends the double bind. The state of the law regarding women
closely resembles the limited choices faced by workers during the Lochner era, during
which employees were in a double bind. At that time, people believed that an
employee was always free to refuse an unfavorable employment contract. Peller,
supra note 3, at 1195. Proponents of Lochner saw individuals as totally autonomous
free agents, who create the social conditions in which they live. Id. at 1208-09.
Today, however, we view the employee's choice as constrained by the need to support
a family, by the organization of the labor market in the industry, and by the
employee's socioeconomic position. Id. at 1195. Women face a similar dilemma:
because they have the responsibility of raising children, their choices are limited.
202. Men who co-parent today, however, typically have been raised by women and
do not easily shake the gender-differentiated aspects of their upbringing. See DIANE
EHRENSAFT, PARENTING TOGETHER: MEN AND WOMEN SHARING THE CARE OF THEIR
CHILDREN 93-95 (1987). As a result, in keeping with Chodorow's theory, "women 'are'
mothers while men 'do' mothering." Id. at 94. But the children who are raised by
both parents seem to exhibit a balance of female and male gender role identities.
Male children, as well as female, show a significant capacity for empathy and an
ability to interrelate. Id. at 236-37; see also Abraham Sagi, Antecedents and Conse-
quences of Various Degrees of Paternal Involvement in Child Rearing: The Israeli
Project, in NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES: PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 205,
217-23 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 1982) [hereinafter NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES].
We understand the psychological importance of the father's presence to children
at the time of divorce. Courts encourage frequent visitation and have abrogated the
tender years presumption, at times even awarding the father physical custody of
young children. Ironically, we tend to overlook the importance of the male role model
before divorce, although that is when it is easier to share responsibility. Some femi-
nists advocate shared parental and domestic responsibility. See, e.g., CHODOROW,
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surrounding altruism. More children would be enabled to
mature relationally and experience giving without a fear of
loss.2"3 The tendency to downgrade women would play less
of a role in the development of masculinity. I am suggesting
that genderized child care breeds incomplete human beings,
halflings. Many men are individuated, but are overly depen-
dent on women for emotional sustenance and afraid to concede
to deeply felt affective needs. Many women are in tune with
relational needs, but are insufficiently individuated. °4
What is at stake is the liberty of both men and women to
pursue a livelihood without denying the fundamental impor-
tance of relational needs.
However, a general social acceptance of shared parenting
and the necessary changes that need to be introduced into
the workplace 20' require an acknowledgement of relational
THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING, supra note 7, at 218; EHRENSAFT, supra, at
257-58; and OKIN, supra note 8, at 171.
203. I do not mean to suggest that nontraditional families are deficient for the
purpose of raising children. The absence of a father as a role model in families in
which both sexes are raised by women should not necessarily cause problems for
children. See RHODE, supra note 8, at 145 (contending that gays and lesbians are the
same as heterosexuals in terms of intimacy, caring, and affection); Regina Austin,
Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIs. L. REV. 539, 566 (criticizing the mainstream condemna-
tion of black unwed motherhood as a variant of patriarchy). Nontraditional families
are not by definition incapable of raising healthy children. Indeed, I believe that it
is the pathology of the traditional family in its insistence on rigid, hierarchical social
roles that breeds emotional problems in future generations.
204. See supra note 150.
205. At least one country has already introduced such changes into the workplace.
In Sweden, legislation grants 180 days a year leave of absence with 90% of income
to either parent after the birth of a child. A father or a mother is also entitled to 180
days leave per year to care for a child up through the child's first year in school.
Fathers may also take ten days leave immediately following the mother's hospitaliza-
tion to care for the older children and to share in newborn responsibility. Parents
may work a six-hour day until the children are past the age of eight. Either is
entitled to 60 days a year for caring for sick children. Employers are compelled to
guarantee a return to employment without retaliation to any parent who utilizes the
parental leave plan. See Finley, supra note 95, at 1173-74; Michael E. Lamb et al.,
Varying Degrees of Paternal Involvement in Infant Care: Attitudinal and Behavioral
Correlates, in NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES, supra note 202, at 117, 117-18. Despite
the legislation, however, few fathers have taken advantage of the option. Id. at 118.
Currently there is a bill pending in our Congress that would entitle employees to
family-related leave (twelve work weeks during any twelve-month period) upon the
birth or adoption of a child and in order to care for a "son, daughter, spouse, or
parent of the employee who has a serious health condition." S. 5, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 102(a)(1)(C) (1991). The Swedish caretaker has a right to full-time leave
every year until the child reaches one and a half years of age, and reduced working
hours until the child is eight years old. Finley, supra note 95, at 1173-74. The
proposed congressional legislation, however, requires that the child suffer a serious
physical illness in order for additional leave to be granted. S. 5 § 102 (a)(1)(C). What
Redefining the Family
needs. These needs are given minimal worth as long as child
care remains genderized and undervalued.2"6  Moreover,
hierarchical social roles within the family are but one aspect
of the many pervasive systemic constraints on women,
reproduced not just in the family, but in all of our cultural,
political, and economic institutions. Without eradicating the
overall exploitation of women and reconceptualizing social
roles free of gender bias, relational needs and caring will
continue to be undervalued.
We must begin somewhere to break the cycle which repro-
duces domination. We should encourage enabling legislation
that facilitates co-parenting and requires the workplace to
become responsive to the importance of the family, instead of
creating conflicts between men and women."' A workplace
remains unrecognized is the child's emotional need for the caretaker's presence, vital
to the growth of a healthy child. The leave is not necessarily paid for by the
employer, and the Act excludes businesses with fewer than 50 employees. Id.
§§ 101(5), 102(c)(d). The Act will not benefit many families, and does not necessarily
degenderize parenting. Nonetheless, it represents a first step. Instead of defining
an individual in terms of his or her job, there is some recognition of the person as a
part of a family.
206. Day-care workers are a good example of the low value given to the caretaking
role. In one salary reevaluation study, zoo keepers were assigned higher wage levels
than those who care for our children because the skills of the former are "acquired,"
not "innate." See Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1207,
1231.
207. Because co-parenting is not a widely considered alternative, and women's
position is still seen by many as 'naturally" in the family, workplace policies tend to
adopt a male profile on health benefits. Attempts to accommodate women in the
workforce, such as pregnancy leave, should not be seen as discrimination against
men, but as meeting the needs of both men and women, whose family lives are of
great value. See Finley, supra note 95, at 1165-81; see also California Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 292 (1987) (holding that a California statute
requiring employers to provide pregnancy disability leave and to reinstate employees
returning from such pregnancy leave is not preempted by or inconsistent with Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
Equal protection should not mean a theory of exceptions from what is the male
norm, but a recognition of the different needs that enhance our lives together. The
workplace should be safe for women as well as men. In a recent decision, the
Supreme Court held that an employer's fetal protection policy excluding women of
child-bearing ability from jobs which require exposure to lead was facially discrimina-
tory, in violation of Title VII. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196,
1207-08 (1991). Gender bias in the workplace is not removed, however, nor is the
family protected, by giving women the right to work in a hazardous environment.
Johnson Controls grants women the right to risk their procreative functions, hardly
a desirable solution for the women involved. The decision represents the failure of
equal rights analysis to address the real-life problems of women. What women
workers need is a workplace free of environmental hazards, not the right to "choose"
between sterilization in order to work and sterilization as a result of work.
The legislative failure to promote the policy of co-parenting leads to half-way
measures such as Felice Schwartz's suggestion that companies establish separate
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obliged by law to consider the needs of the family would help
to alleviate women's present situation and could provide the
basic framework for a more ideal future, a degenderized
society. Furthermore, in working together to redefine the
family by including its neglected members, we begin to reverse
the hierarchy of values implicitly weighed in the law and to
express a new collective ethic. We, as a society, can choose to
value caring more than commerce and can insist that the
family be in the forefront of the market.
CONCLUSION
In The Fall, the lawyer's failure to rescue is not callous
indifference. Beneath the pose of cynicism, there is more than
the lack of simple, masculine, heroic courage. What he fears
is not just the annihilation of his physical existence. The risk
is to his conception of self. His fear of submerging himself in
the cold waters of the Seine and embracing the drowning
woman is the same fear of intimacy he has experienced with
all the women he encountered in his life.2"' According to
paths for career-oriented women and for women who want to combine career and
family. Felice N. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, 67 HARV.
Bus. REV. 65 (1989). Schwartz's proposal, dubbed the "Mommy Track," has been
criticized for advocating that women who want families should accept second-class
career status and second-class salaries. See, e.g., Audrey Freedman, Those Costly
'Good Old Boys', N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1989, at A23. No one considers "Daddy
Tracking" because we assume that child care is a woman's responsibility. Even law
school curricula indirectly educate law students to ignore the value of the caretaking
role by placing more importance on business courses than family law. We need to
sensitize future lawyers to these concerns. As Catharine MacKinnon put it:
In reality ... virtually every quality that distinguishes men from women is
already affirmatively compensated in this society. Men's physiology defines
most sports, their needs define auto and health insurance coverage, their
socially designed biographies define workplace expectations and successful
career patterns, their perspectives and concerns define quality in scholarship,
their experiences and obsessions define merit, their objectification of life
defines art, their military service defines citizenship, their presence defines
family, their inability to get along with each other-their wars and ruler-
ships-defines history, their image defines god, and their genitals define sex.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 36 (1987) (footnote omitted). To
be of comparable worth, a woman must be both male and female. A man need only
be himself.
208. See CAMUS, supra note 1, at 57-59.
Redefining the Family
Freud, birth is often represented in the unconscious by water
symbols and in connection with acts of rescue. °9 Dreams or
fantasies of emerging from water refer to one's birth. The
significance of rescue varies, however, depending on whether
the rescuer is a male or female. To a woman, rescuing
another from the water is an act of mothering.21 ° To a male,
saving a woman from drowning means that he has made her
his mother.21" ' For the lawyer, and for the law, to dare to
take the plunge is to risk drowning and regressing to child-
hood, a state of dependency and merger that is the ultimate
loss of self.
Redefining the family and recognizing relational loss can
lead to a change in the consciousness of self, a social construct
re-presented and partially formed by law. In acknowledging
the caretaker's role in society, we deliberate on the importance
of companionship and intimacy, the altruistic gift of care
needed in everyone's life, and heighten a shared sense of
common humanity. We foster a holistic approach to justice,
instead of a narrow focus on the physical labor involved. The
dominant masculine voice of detachment is supplanted by the
feminine. The caring voice is heard. Restructuring parenting
and degenderizing social roles become realistic possibilities if
the law insists that we are responsible for each other.
Although the legal system is a reflection as well as a
determinant of dominant cultural beliefs, and its rhetoric can
depersonalize and separate us, it can at times transcend the
climate in which it exists and provide guidance for a change
in values. Through its moral teaching function, and out of a
respected tradition of influence, law's transformative power
can effectuate social change. Rewarding the caretaker's
altruism will enable us to express a new discourse of empathy
and responsibility, helping us to realize our full potential as
interrelated human beings.
209. For a more complete discussion of Freud's interpretation of water and rescue
symbols, see SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS 272-73, 275 (A.A.
Brill trans., The Modern Library 1950) (1913); SIGMUND FREUD, Contributions to the
Psychology of Love, in SEXUALITY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LovE 49, 57 (Philip Rieff
ed., 1963) [hereinafter FREUD, Contributions to the Psychology of Love].
210. FREUD, Contributions to the Psychology of Love, supra note 209, at 57. For
example, the Pharaoh's daughter became the mother of Moses after rescuing him
from the Nile. Id.
211. Id.
WINTER 1992]
504 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 25:2
What can one do to become another? Impossible. One
would have to cease being anyone, forget oneself for
someone else, at least once. But how?
212
How the one becomes more than oneself is initiated in the
family. Redefining and valuing the family's needs are tasks
within our grasp and remain our greatest moral responsibility.
212. CAMUS, supra note 1, at 144-45.
